fix(server): harden deployment, media, state, jobs
- Lock down /media/: deny state.json, DBs, sessions; allowlist extensions incl. archives/docs (M-1) - parse_bool() fixes; HEAD 404; shutdown drains queue; range edge cases (M-3, M-4, M-7, M-8) - int() coercion -> 400; no filesystem paths in errors; path-only access log (M-19, L-1) - Security headers, QR TTL 60s, trusted-host allowlist, legacy add/remove via update() (L-4, L-5, L-6, L-8) - Clean continuous channels on import and migration; restart-during-drain; tombstone managers (F-1, F-3, F-4) - Durability: fsync + unique tmp + stale sweep + 0600/0700 perms (M-10, M-18) - Jobs run on dedicated loop thread; set_scrape_media passthrough; media chunked; state throttled; exact media file reuse; honest scrape failure status (M-11, M-12, M-13, M-14) - Health aggregates per-account; legacy GETs delegate post-migration (M-15, M-9) - k8s: runAsNonRoot 1000 + resource limits, no readOnlyRootFilesystem (M-16) - UI: dropped-invalid and credentials-reentry toasts; swagger XSS-safe (F-2, L-9, L-2) - CI: non-blocking pip-audit job in both workflows (L-3) - 50 tests passing; REVIEW.md updated (C-1/M-20 won't fix: local-only by design)
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@@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ async function importAccount(event) {
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await loadAccounts();
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await loadAccount(accountId);
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showToast(`Imported ${accountId}.`, 'success');
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showToast('Credentials (api_id/api_hash) are not exported for security — re-enter them in Settings if needed.', 'warn');
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} catch (err) {
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showToast(`Failed to import account: ${err.message}`, 'error');
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}
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