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renovate-bot e451c97dfc chore(deps): update container patch updates
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2026-09-28 19:56:45 +00:00
forust 33c54ac830 Merge pull request 'chore(deps): update docker.io/valkey/valkey:9 docker digest to 418652c' (#59) from renovate/docker.io-valkey-valkey-9 into main
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Reviewed-on: #59
2026-09-28 19:56:27 +00:00
renovate-bot b09d718310 chore(deps): update docker.io/valkey/valkey:9 docker digest to 418652c
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2026-09-28 16:20:21 +00:00
forust b4f76373bb fix(gitea): serve issue search from postgres instead of reindexing on boot
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cron.rebuild_issue_indexer runs at start, so every gitea pod restart reindexed the whole issue index and read ~7MB/s off the rotational disk for an hour.
2026-09-28 17:01:36 +02:00
forust 74adf38d63 feat(alerts): cover OOM kills, restart loops and evictions
The OOMKilled container behind the immich crash loop was invisible: PodCrashLooping only fires once kubelet has already given up and started the backoff.
2026-09-28 17:01:36 +02:00
forust f5b2f89f38 style(immich): match repo prettier quoting in compose file
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2026-09-28 17:00:41 +02:00
forust 8e63284240 feat(immich): add self-hosted photo backup with dedicated postgres
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Server x2, machine learning, valkey and VectorChord postgres on local storage, Traefik routes for external and internal access.
2026-09-28 16:42:05 +02:00
forust 1d81410cd8 fix(traefik): persist plugin storage on a PVC
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Mount traefik-plugins PVC at /plugins-storage instead of the chart default emptyDir, so the crowdsec-bouncer download survives node reboots. Without this Traefik starts before the network is ready, the download from plugins.traefik.io times out, plugins get disabled and every route behind the middleware returns 404/503 until a manual restart.
2026-09-28 13:36:46 +02:00
forust 2f891a5d31 fix(postgres): give probes room on an I/O-bound single node
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pg_isready with the 1s default times out under I/O stall and kubelet kills a healthy postgres mid-recovery; each kill restarts a multi-minute fsync from zero and loops forever. readiness/liveness timeout 5s, liveness threshold 5, startup budget 15min.
2026-09-28 12:35:16 +02:00
forust cda0022d81 fix(renovate): reap finished job pods with ttlSecondsAfterFinished
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History limits never delete manual 'create job --from' runs, so Failed pods accumulated for a week. Keep a day for debugging, reap the rest.
2026-09-28 12:03:26 +02:00
forust dde6b1c743 fix(deploy): recover helm releases from pending-* and skip helm-owned rollbacks
An --atomic upgrade whose own rollback never finishes leaves the release in pending-*, blocking every future run until a human rolls back (loki rev 18/21). Recover automatically before and after each upgrade, and fail loud when recovery does not land on deployed. Also skip helm-managed workloads in rollback_workloads: rollout undo there would step back to the revision --atomic just escaped.
2026-09-28 12:03:26 +02:00
forust 7c4843c88c fix(loki): unblock gateway rollout on a single node
Chart default is required podAntiAffinity on hostname plus RollingUpdate 25%/25%, which is maxUnavailable=0 at replicas=1: the new pod stays Unschedulable while the old one lives, and the old one never leaves while the new one is not Ready. Null the affinity (an empty map deep-merges with the default and keeps the rule) and set maxSurge/maxUnavailable to 1.
2026-09-28 11:33:38 +02:00
forust f9e4623ade fix(k8s): size the remaining workloads against measured use
Finishes the sizing pass over every workload the deploy actually manages. Each
request is at or above the container's p95 over the last seven days, so nothing
is sized below what it is known to use, and each limit is between 1.6x and 5x
the observed max, which is the figure that decides whether a burst gets an
OOMKill.

Some of these go up, and that is the point. adguard was holding 975M against a
500Mi request and netbox 962M against 512Mi, so both sat permanently above
their own request and were standing eviction candidates on a node that has
about 300M of headroom. Raising a request costs scheduler room; leaving it low
costs the pod its place in the queue when the node gets tight.

Others come down. loki ran with a 2Gi limit on 224M, gitea 1.5Gi on 305M, the
authentik worker 1Gi on 305M, and a tail of single-purpose pods -- redis,
glance, the two homepages, cfddns, session-keeper, the netbird dashboard, the
loki gateway -- each reserved 4x to 16x more than they have ever touched.

prometheus gets the opposite treatment: 768Mi/2560Mi, above its p95, because it
compacts its TSDB in place and that is a burst worth budgeting for rather than
throttling.

Two of these limits are close enough to the observed max to be worth watching
rather than trusting: adguard at 1.5x, and its DNS cache grows monotonically, so
the ceiling is a date, not a margin. That was true before this change too; the
pod sizing does not fix it and the cache needs bounding.

CPU limits are untouched throughout. Leaving postgres alone as well: it sits in
an uncommitted file that belongs to other work in progress.

Verified: every request is at or above p95 and every limit above the observed
max across all 74 containers, and 16/16 local gates pass.
2026-09-28 10:38:19 +02:00
forust 2ad4fa1b82 chore(portainer): stop deploying a container manager nothing routes to
Portainer had been running for 111 days with a 512Mi request and a 2Gi limit
against 50M of measured use, on a node that is short of memory. It is a UI over
the Docker socket; nothing in the repo or the cluster depends on it.

The marker goes, not the manifests. `portainer/k8s/active` is what puts these
files in the deploy's manifest set, so without it the next push leaves the
namespace alone and the manifests stay on disk for a one-command return. This
also matters for the smoke stage: that host list is built from the active
directories, so `portainer.forust.xyz` leaves it and the new router check does
not go looking for a route to a service we just retired.

In the cluster the Deployment, the Service and both IngressRoutes are deleted.
The routes go first: leaving an IngressRoute behind a deleted Service keeps a
Traefik router pointing at nothing, which answers 502 while looking perfectly
healthy to the stage that just started checking for routers.

Deliberately kept, so this is reversible rather than destructive: the namespace,
the 2Gi `portainer-data-pvc` and both Certificates stay. Re-enabling is
`git checkout HEAD~1 -- portainer/k8s/active` plus an apply, and no Let's Encrypt
quota is spent reissuing the production certificate.

`glance` still links to `portainer.forust.xyz` and that tile will now be a 404.
Left alone on purpose. The Cloudflare record is manual and cfddns only ever
creates records, so `portainer.forust.xyz` keeps resolving until it is removed
in the dashboard, same as `dockmon.forust.xyz`.

Verified: no Traefik router matches portainer any more, all 19 hosts left in the
smoke list still have a router, and 16/16 local gates pass.
2026-09-28 10:22:51 +02:00
forust 2a4f215546 fix(k8s): bring the over-reserved memory limits down to measured use
Six pods reserved far more memory than they have ever touched. uptime-kuma held
a 3Gi limit against 469M of measured p95, metube 2Gi against 72M, convertx
1.5Gi against 85M, netbird-server 1Gi against 97M, searxng 700Mi against 134M
and bentopdf 700Mi against 4M. Every one of them is a ceiling the scheduler
counts against the node while the memory sits unused.

Requests move down with the limits but never below the measured p95, so none of
these becomes an eviction candidate as a side effect of being right-sized. The
limits keep between 2.2x and 11.6x over the observed max, which is the figure
that decides whether a pod gets OOM-killed during a burst.

Net effect across the six: requests -557M, limits -4.6Gi, all of it ceiling that
was never in use. This is the first change that actually gives memory back.

CPU limits are left exactly as they were. They were not part of the sizing pass,
they are not being hit on a node sitting at 5% CPU, and removing them is a
separate decision from moving memory.

Verified: each limit is above the container's own observed max and each request
is above its p95, and 16/16 local gates pass.
2026-09-28 10:20:24 +02:00
forust 16aaeb60c1 fix(k8s): set requests and limits on the pods that shipped with neither
Eighteen containers had no memory limit at all, so nothing on the node could
bound them. Three of the values files even claimed to set resources: Helm does
not complain about a key it does not recognise, so the block sat there looking
like a limit while the pod ran unbounded.

alloy is the one that mattered. The chart reads `alloy.resources`; the file had
`controller.resources`, so the DaemonSet that tails every pod log on the node
shipped with nothing at all. `kubeStateMetrics` is the same trap in a different
shape -- that is the condition key, the values live under `kube-state-metrics` --
and `configReloader` in the alloy chart sits at the top level rather than under
`alloy`. Each one is verified by rendering the chart and reading the resources
back off the containers, because a values key that is ignored looks exactly
like one that works.

reloader turned out to be set and still wrong: 64Mi request against a measured
p95 of 73M, so the pod ran permanently above its own request and stayed a
standing eviction candidate. That is the pod that restarts every other pod, so
it is the last one that should be evicted. Raised to 96Mi.

Requests are set at p95 throughout, grafana, playwright and alloy included.
Left at the values first proposed they would have sat below their own p95 and
queued for eviction ahead of everything smaller. CPU limits are deliberately
absent: the node is I/O bound at 5% CPU, and CFS throttling would turn disk
wait into runnable-throttled, which is the failure mode that took the node down.

The prometheus and alertmanager configReloader sidecars are left open: chart
86.2.3 does not template the key, so reaching those two containers needs a
postRenderer.

Verified: all four charts render with the resources landing on the intended
containers, and 16/16 local gates pass.
2026-09-28 10:14:52 +02:00
forust a5409edbf2 fix(deploy): fail the smoke stage when Traefik has no route for a host
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The smoke stage treats any HTTP response as proof the service is serving,
which is right -- a 302 to a login or a 404 from a path the app does not
serve still means the chain is intact. But a 404 is not evidence of that on
its own: a router Traefik refused to build answers with exactly the same
404 and nothing behind it.

That is not hypothetical. The crowdsec bouncer is a plugin, and when Traefik
cannot fetch it at startup it disables the plugin without failing, then drops
every router whose chain referenced it. Sixteen routes answered 404 and the
stage printed `ok` for all sixteen, because a dropped router and an unserved
path are indistinguishable from outside.

The Kubernetes objects cannot tell us either: the IngressRoute is still
sitting there looking healthy, the router Traefik built from it is simply not
there. So ask Traefik. api.insecure is already on for the internal entrypoint
and the router list says which hosts it matches right now.

Every probed host has to appear in that list. HTTP routers only -- the TCP
ones match on a HostSNI wildcard and the UDP ones carry no rule at all, both
selected by entrypoint and port, so neither can answer the question. A router
mid-rollout is legitimately absent for a moment, so the list is re-read twice
over 20s; a plugin that failed to load stays absent and waiting cannot rescue
it. An unreadable router list fails the stage rather than skipping the check,
since a check that cannot run is not a passing check.

Verified against the live cluster: all 23 public routes have a router and the
stage passes. With gitea, grafana and uptime removed from that list the
probes still answer and the stage fails on exactly those three.
2026-09-28 09:13:24 +02:00
forust c70d2db3a1 ci: deploy the image the commit built, not whatever the tag points at
Every service tracked the mutable `:prod` tag, so a deploy applied whatever
that tag happened to name at the time rather than the commit it was
deploying. A rollback had no way to state what it was rolling back to, and
two deploys of one commit could land different images.

CI now publishes an immutable `sha-<commit12>` tag beside `:prod` on main,
and re-tags it for every image a push did not rebuild. That re-tag copies
the manifest list, so no layer moves. The deploy resolves the immutable tag
to a digest and pins the workload to it, and only falls back to the moving
tag when the immutable one cannot be resolved -- which it says out loud,
because that fallback is the deploy quietly ceasing to be reproducible from
its own commit.

The image list comes out of the tree with git grep rather than being written
out a second time, so adding a service no longer means keeping two lists in
step.

build also gains the three jobs it was skipping -- scan-deps, test-backend,
test-frontend -- so a change that breaks them cannot be tagged at all. The
two run blocks where a mid-loop failure was survivable now run under
set -euo pipefail: the build loop and the service detector both carried on
past an error and could report a green build having produced nothing.

The registry password moves from run: substitution into an env: block. A
quote, a backtick or a $(...) in the password is parsed as shell before the
command ever runs, and a login that failed that way looked exactly like a
build that failed.

The apply and verify timeouts stay at 45 and 30 minutes. The comments now
record the arithmetic that says so rather than leaving the numbers to be
raised on the next scare: three no-op helm upgrades run 3-5 minutes, one
broken release is a single 10 minute rollback because the loop aborts on
the first failure, and the apply loop itself is about a minute. That is
roughly 15 minutes of work against a 45 minute budget. verify is 32
workloads at 8 wide -- four waves of 300 seconds, 20 minutes -- which
leaves room for two serial rollbacks, and only becomes derivable at 45 once
rollback_workloads is parallelised.
2026-09-28 09:12:01 +02:00
forust 24dd82e801 fix(crowdsec): make the bouncer trust the mobile range independently
The parser-stage whitelist already covers 84.245.64.0/18, so an event
from the phone is dropped before it reaches a bucket and no decision is
ever created for it - confirmed against 72h of traefik access logs, where
the phone shows up as 84.245.120.147, inside that /18. But that left the
bouncer's own ClientTrustedIPs without the range, so the guarantee rested
on a single config. If the parser whitelist ever stops matching, a ban
would be created and then served against the phone, which is the one
thing that must not happen: the address belongs to a carrier, so it comes
back to us by rotation and a 4h ban is not survivable from the device.

ClientTrustedIPs bypasses the bouncer and the decision cache entirely, so
repeating the range there holds even if a decision exists for any reason.
All nine parser-stage ranges are now mirrored in the bouncer, and the
bouncer has no range the parser stage does not know about.

The file header now records that this middleware must be applied together
with a traefik restart. Applying it alone wedges the plugin: in stream
mode handleStreamTicker runs over package-level globals that no
reconfiguration stops, so every route referencing the middleware answers
404 with 'invalid middleware crowdsec-crowdsec-bouncer@kubernetescrd'
until the pod is replaced. Re-applying the prior config does not recover
it and the config is not the cause - NewChecker is a plain net.ParseCIDR
and cannot fail on a valid range. That cost 21 routes down before the
restart requirement was found; recovery is a pod replace, ~35s.

Verified live: middleware applied, traefik restarted, 17 of 20 hosts
serving (the three exceptions are unchanged and unrelated - searxng
returns its own 429, checkmk is down with 503, and one host is
local-only), zero invalid-middleware errors, and the LAPI still shows
/v1/decisions/stream polls at the 15s interval.
2026-09-27 18:52:27 +02:00
forust 11e92fdf4e fix(deploy): bound ssh hangs and retry the stage on transport loss
A connection that died silently used to hang until the job timeout, and
the stage was never re-run. One flaky TCP session cost a whole
45-minute apply, and the symptom - a job that stops mid-output with no
error - is what made the last few deploy failures expensive to read.

ServerAliveInterval/CountMax cap how long a dead peer goes unnoticed at
~60s, ConnectTimeout caps setup. Only exit 255 - ssh's own transport
failures - is retried, up to three attempts with a growing gap. A stage
that fails on its own merits exits with the remote's status, so a real
failure surfaces its own log immediately instead of being repeated three
times over 45 minutes. The stages are declarative applies, so re-running
one that had already committed is harmless.

The stage environment now goes through `env` as separate argv entries
rather than one interpolated string, so nothing in REPO, DEPLOY_SHA or
DEPLOY_SNAPSHOT_DIR is re-split by the remote shell.

Verified against a stubbed ssh: clean run attempts once, a single
transport failure recovers on attempt 2 and exits 0, three failures give
up preserving 255, and a stage failing with 1 or 7 attempts once and
passes the code through unchanged.

Also records why USERBOT_IMAGE stays on the prod tag: render_pinned
rewrites only plain `image:` lines, and this ref is what the panel
injects into the per-instance Deployments it creates, so those instances
track the tag rather than the panel's own resolved digest. The two
panel-created instances currently in the cluster are digest-pinned, so
the panel does accept one either way; the tag is the choice, not a
limitation.
2026-09-27 18:26:25 +02:00
forust b1f98fc148 Revert "fix(compose): stop pointing at the tag the build dropped" for dtek_notif
dtek-notif is being picked up again, so leave its compose alone. It is
also the one image not rebuilt since the build dropped :latest, so
:prod does not exist for it yet - unlike the other six, which resolve.
Keeping this file out of the change also keeps dtek_notif/* out of the
build's changed-service detector, so pushing does not build an image
nobody asked for.
2026-09-27 18:17:32 +02:00
forust 9b91b5847e fix(compose): stop pointing at the tag the build dropped
These five stacks still asked for :latest, but the build stopped pushing
it - on main it only pushes main and prod, on dev only dev. Every one of
these images therefore resolved only because the registry still had a
stale :latest from before that change, and the next time one of them was
actually built the reference would have dangled.

Named for dtek-notif: of the seven, only that one still resolved at
:prod, because it is the only image not rebuilt since the build dropped
:latest - and it is the only one of these five stacks the deploy does not
manage (no `active` marker, and its file is docker-compose.yaml, which
the COMPOSE_STACKS glob does not even match). Touching
dtek_notif/docker-compose.yaml matches dtek_notif/* in the build's
changed-service detector, so pushing this builds it and publishes
:prod for it too.

Verified the other six resolve at :prod in the registry.
2026-09-27 18:11:45 +02:00
forust 892790822d fix(crowdsec): stop the 403 loop that banned our own VPS and runner
Chasing why apply-k8s kept dying mid-run turned up a self-inflicted
ban loop. 585 of 586 LePresidente/http-generic-403-bf alerts in the LAPI
came from 193.181.211.79 - our own VPS - POSTing
/management.ManagementService/GetServerKey, i.e. the NetBird client's
own management call. netbird-server had never seen a single one of them,
so the 403 was not NetBird's: the bouncer was rejecting the request
before it got there. A banned peer keeps retrying, each retry is another
403, and the scenario turns five 403s in ten seconds into a 4h ban, so
the loop kept re-arming the ban it was serving. The hourly janitor step
that deleted those decisions hourly was masking all of it.

* netbird/k8s/ingress.yaml - drop the bouncer from the mesh API routes
  (gRPC-gateway management, signal, relay, /api, /oauth2). A ban there
  locks a peer out of the network it needs to reach anything else, and
  those endpoints authenticate by NetBird token, not by a login form.
  The dashboard keeps the bouncer; it is a real login surface.
  netbird-local was already exempt, so this makes prod match.

* crowdsec-middleware.yaml - CrowdsecMode stream instead of live. live
  blocked on GET /v1/decisions per request, so a burst saturated the
  LAPI and the plugin 403'd IPs that were never banned. v1.3.3 ignores
  UpdateMaxFailure in live, so fail-open is only reachable in stream;
  -1 now means an unreachable LAPI degrades to "no protection" rather
  than "every site 403". 15s poll instead of the 60s default, because
  the runner shares one public IP with the house.

  Also corrects the key name: HTTPTimeoutSeconds, not
  CrowdsecLapiTimeout, which never existed and was being silently
  dropped, leaving the 10s default. Back at 10, not the 2s f7cd75d
  guessed - a pull that times out leaves the ban cache frozen at its
  startup contents, so new bans would silently never apply.

* crowdsec-values.yaml - CIDR allowlisting moves to parsers/s02-enrich,
  where CrowdSec's docs put it: a parser whitelist drops the event before
  it reaches a bucket, so those addresses never become a decision at
  all. The old postoverflow LAN list was checked only after the ban
  existed, which is the window the deploy kept landing in. Added
  100.64.0.0/10, which the RFC 1918 blocks miss and where the
  workstation, the k0s node and the VPS actually live. The DDNS
  home-IP whitelist stays in postoverflows, because resolving a hostname
  is the expensive check the docs reserve that stage for.

  ClientTrustedIPs mirrors that list so the bouncer skips the LAPI
  round-trip entirely for those addresses.

* janitor-cronjob.yaml - drop step 5. The bouncer can no longer
  manufacture 403s, so the only remaining firings of that scenario are
  real scanners, and deleting their decisions hourly was undoing a
  working ban.

* Also lands the LAPI config.yaml.local (SQLite WAL, Central API off,
  bounded flush) that f7cd75d's comments referenced but never included:
  the LAPI was blocked in fsync on its rollback journal, and the CAPI
  resolver held a write transaction while timing out against a host
  this network cannot reach.

Verified in-cluster: no new 403-bf alerts in the 3.5min after applying,
the management endpoint answers 404 from the backend instead of 403 from
the bouncer in 0.17s, and the VPS client reports Management and Signal
connected with 2/2 relays.
2026-09-27 18:09:07 +02:00
62 changed files with 1400 additions and 199 deletions

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+108 -49
View File
@@ -464,7 +464,24 @@ jobs:
build:
needs:
[lint-actionlint, lint-shellcheck, lint-compose, lint-prettier, lint-ruff, lint-yaml, lint-dockerfiles, validate]
# scan-deps and the two test jobs were missing here, so a commit with a
# known-vulnerable dependency or a failing test still moved the :prod tag.
# The deploy was blocked either way - it requires the whole workflow to
# have succeeded - but the tag had already moved, and the next deploy to
# run resolved it. Publishing and passing the checks are the same gate.
[
lint-actionlint,
lint-shellcheck,
lint-compose,
lint-prettier,
lint-ruff,
lint-yaml,
lint-dockerfiles,
scan-deps,
test-backend,
test-frontend,
validate,
]
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' && (github.ref_name == 'main' || github.ref_name == 'dev')
runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, arch, homelab]
timeout-minutes: 60
@@ -480,12 +497,20 @@ jobs:
id: services
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
base="${{ github.event.before }}"
if [ -z "$base" ] || [ "$base" = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" ]; then
base="$(git rev-list --max-parents=0 HEAD)"
fi
mapfile -t changed_files < <(git diff --name-only "$base" "${GITHUB_SHA}")
# A failed diff used to leave changed_files empty, which reads exactly
# like "nothing to build": the job went green having built nothing and
# the tag never moved. The status is checked, not assumed.
if ! changed="$(git diff --name-only "$base" "${GITHUB_SHA}")"; then
echo "::error::cannot diff ${base}..${GITHUB_SHA}"
exit 1
fi
mapfile -t changed_files <<<"$changed"
services=()
@@ -535,30 +560,57 @@ jobs:
- name: Log in to registry
if: steps.services.outputs.services != ''
shell: bash
# Through env, not by substitution into the script. A secret written
# into a run: block is pasted into the shell source before bash parses
# it, so a password containing a quote, a backtick or $(...) becomes
# code that runs. Masking the value in the log does not prevent that.
env:
REGISTRY_USERNAME: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}
REGISTRY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
run: |
echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}" | docker login "${REGISTRY}" \
-u "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}" \
set -euo pipefail
printf '%s' "$REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login "${REGISTRY}" \
-u "$REGISTRY_USERNAME" \
--password-stdin
- name: Build and push changed images
if: steps.services.outputs.services != ''
shell: bash
run: |
# This step was the one run: block in the workflow without it, and it
# is the one that cannot afford it: a docker push that failed partway
# through the loop used to be followed by more pushes, the loop's exit
# status came from the last one, and the job went green with half the
# images missing from the registry.
set -euo pipefail
IFS=, read -r -a services <<< "${{ steps.services.outputs.services }}"
# Tags for this push. The commit-pinned name is the point of this
# step: the deploy resolves it in preference to :prod, so a deploy
# that sat in the queue behind a later push still gets the build of
# the commit CI validated, instead of whatever :prod points at by the
# time it runs. See render_pinned in deploy-lib.sh.
commit_tag=""
if [ "${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" = "main" ]; then
commit_tag="sha-${GITHUB_SHA:0:12}"
fi
set_tags() {
tags=()
case "${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" in
main) tags+=("main" "prod") ;;
dev) tags+=("dev") ;;
esac
if [ -n "$commit_tag" ]; then
tags+=("$commit_tag")
fi
}
for service in "${services[@]}"; do
case "$service" in
dtek_notif)
image="${REGISTRY}/forust/dtek-notif"
tags=()
case "${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" in
main)
tags+=("main" "prod")
;;
dev)
tags+=("dev")
;;
esac
set_tags
build_args=()
for tag in "${tags[@]}"; do
build_args+=(-t "${image}:${tag}")
@@ -573,15 +625,7 @@ jobs:
;;
errorpages)
image="${REGISTRY}/forust/error-pages"
tags=()
case "${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" in
main)
tags+=("main" "prod")
;;
dev)
tags+=("dev")
;;
esac
set_tags
build_args=()
for tag in "${tags[@]}"; do
build_args+=(-t "${image}:${tag}")
@@ -595,15 +639,7 @@ jobs:
done
;;
userbot)
tags=()
case "${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" in
main)
tags+=("main" "prod")
;;
dev)
tags+=("dev")
;;
esac
set_tags
for target in runtime panel; do
case "$target" in
runtime)
@@ -638,15 +674,7 @@ jobs:
image="${REGISTRY}/forust/xdfnx-homepage"
;;
esac
tags=()
case "${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" in
main)
tags+=("main" "prod")
;;
dev)
tags+=("dev")
;;
esac
set_tags
build_args=()
for tag in "${tags[@]}"; do
build_args+=(-t "${image}:${tag}")
@@ -672,15 +700,7 @@ jobs:
image="${REGISTRY}/forust/webinar-checker"
;;
esac
tags=()
case "${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" in
main)
tags+=("main" "prod")
;;
dev)
tags+=("dev")
;;
esac
set_tags
build_args=()
for tag in "${tags[@]}"; do
build_args+=(-t "${image}:${tag}")
@@ -696,3 +716,42 @@ jobs:
;;
esac
done
# Every image the tree names has to carry the commit-pinned name, not only
# the ones this push rebuilt. A push that touches nothing but manifests
# builds nothing, and its deploy would then find no commit-pinned tag to
# resolve and quietly fall back to the moving :prod - which is the whole
# failure the commit-pinned name exists to remove.
#
# Re-tagging copies the manifest list and transfers no layers, so pinning
# six images that already exist costs six registry writes.
#
# The list is derived from the tree rather than written out here, so an
# image added to a manifest is covered without a second place to update.
- name: Pin the commit name on the images this push did not rebuild
if: github.ref_name == 'main'
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
commit_tag="sha-${GITHUB_SHA:0:12}"
mapfile -t repos < <(
git grep -hoE 'gcr\.forust\.xyz/forust/[A-Za-z0-9._-]+' -- '*.yaml' '*.yml' \
| sort -u
)
if [ "${#repos[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "No own images referenced by the tree."
exit 0
fi
echo "pinning ${#repos[@]} image(s) to $commit_tag"
for repo in "${repos[@]}"; do
if docker buildx imagetools inspect "$repo:$commit_tag" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo " already built by this push: ${repo##*/}"
continue
fi
if ! docker buildx imagetools inspect "$repo:prod" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo " WARNING: ${repo##*/} has no :prod to pin and no build produced it"
continue
fi
docker buildx imagetools create --tag "$repo:$commit_tag" "$repo:prod"
echo " pinned ${repo##*/}"
done
+183 -7
View File
@@ -242,11 +242,49 @@ registry_digest() {
| head -1 || true
}
# The commit this deploy is for: what CI validated, or - on a manual dispatch,
# whatever stage_preflight just checked out.
deploy_commit() {
local c="${DEPLOY_SHA:-}"
[ -n "$c" ] || c="$(git -C "$REPO" rev-parse HEAD 2>/dev/null || true)"
printf '%.12s' "${c:-}"
}
# Resolves one of our image refs to the digest THIS commit's build produced.
#
# A manifest naming `:prod` names a pointer, not a version, and the deploy
# resolves it when the apply runs - which is not when CI ran it. Deploy runs are
# queued rather than cancelled (see deploy.yaml), so two pushes in a row leave
# the first deploy resolving the second push's build: the right manifests with
# the wrong code, and nothing anywhere reports it. ci therefore publishes every
# image it ships under `sha-<commit12>`, a name that cannot move, and that is
# the name resolved here.
#
# The fallback to the plain tag is for an image this pipeline never built. It
# reports itself, because a fallback nobody sees is the failure this removes.
pinned_digest() {
local ref="$1" commit pinned
commit="$(deploy_commit)"
if [ -n "$commit" ]; then
pinned="$(registry_digest "${ref%:*}:sha-$commit")"
if [ -n "$pinned" ]; then
printf '%s' "$pinned"
return 0
fi
fi
pinned="$(registry_digest "$ref")"
if [ -n "$pinned" ]; then
echo "WARNING: ${ref} carries no sha-${commit:-<unknown>} tag; resolved the moving tag instead" >&2
fi
printf '%s' "$pinned"
}
# Rewrites our own images to immutable digests on the way into the cluster.
# Reads a manifest stream on stdin, writes the pinned stream to stdout.
#
# A digest is not knowable when a manifest is written, so it is resolved here, at
# apply time, and never committed: git keeps a readable `:prod` tag. That is what
# A digest is not knowable when a manifest is written, so it is never committed:
# git keeps a readable `:prod` tag and the exact bytes are chosen here, at apply
# time, from the tag ci published for the commit being deployed. That is what
# makes rollback mean something. `kubectl rollout undo` restores the previous
# ReplicaSet's pod template verbatim, and a template naming a digest restores the
# exact bytes that were serving before. A template naming a moving tag does not —
@@ -271,7 +309,7 @@ render_pinned() {
while read -r ref; do
[ -n "$ref" ] || continue
digest="$(registry_digest "$ref")"
digest="$(pinned_digest "$ref")"
if [ -z "$digest" ]; then
echo "ERROR: cannot resolve ${ref} in the registry; applying nothing." >&2
echo " The build job has to push that tag before the deploy resolves it." >&2
@@ -339,7 +377,7 @@ restart_stale_images() {
while read -r ns target image; do
[ -n "${target:-}" ] || continue
if [ -z "${digests[$image]:-}" ]; then
digests[$image]="$(registry_digest "$image")"
digests[$image]="$(pinned_digest "$image")"
fi
want="${digests[$image]}"
if [ -z "$want" ]; then
@@ -451,6 +489,14 @@ rollback_workloads() {
local -a recovered=()
while read -r kind ns name; do
[ -n "${kind:-}" ] || continue
# Helm-owned workloads are already rolled back by the release's --atomic
# upgrade. `rollout undo` here would step back to the revision Helm just
# escaped (the failed one), so leave them for the operator instead.
if kubectl get "${kind}/${name}" -n "$ns" -o jsonpath='{.metadata.annotations}' 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'meta.helm.sh/release-name'; then
echo " skip (helm-managed, needs manual check): ${kind}/${ns}/${name}"
unrecovered+=("${kind}/${ns}/${name} (helm-managed)")
continue
fi
if kubectl rollout undo "${kind}/${name}" -n "$ns" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
&& kubectl rollout status "${kind}/${name}" -n "$ns" --timeout="${ROLLOUT_TIMEOUT}s" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo " rolled back: ${kind}/${ns}/${name}"
@@ -489,6 +535,44 @@ helm_repo_for() {
esac
}
# helm_release_status <release> <namespace>
# Prints the release status in lowercase (deployed, failed, pending-rollback,
# ...) or "not-found" when the release does not exist yet.
helm_release_status() {
local out
if ! out="$(helm status "$1" -n "$2" 2>&1)"; then
echo "not-found"
return 0
fi
awk '/^STATUS:/{print $2}' <<<"$out" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]'
}
# recover_pending_release <release> <namespace>
# Rolls a release out of a pending-* state left by a failed --atomic upgrade
# whose own rollback never completed. Without this every future upgrade errors
# out until a human runs `helm rollback`. Passes through releases that are not
# pending (deployed, failed, not-found). Returns non-zero when the release is
# still not recoverable, so the pipeline fails loud instead of wedging.
recover_pending_release() {
local release="$1" namespace="$2" status
status="$(helm_release_status "$release" "$namespace")"
case "$status" in
pending-upgrade|pending-rollback|pending-install)
log "Release $release is $status, rolling back to the last deployed revision"
if ! helm rollback "$release" -n "$namespace" --wait --timeout 10m >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "WARN: helm rollback of $release did not complete"
return 1
fi
status="$(helm_release_status "$release" "$namespace")"
if [ "$status" != "deployed" ]; then
echo "WARN: $release is $status after rollback"
return 1
fi
;;
esac
return 0
}
upgrade_helm_releases() {
local entry release chart namespace version values marker repo
for entry in ${HELM_RELEASES[@]+"${HELM_RELEASES[@]}"}; do
@@ -509,13 +593,31 @@ upgrade_helm_releases() {
helm repo add "${repo%% *}" "${repo#* }" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
helm repo update "${repo%% *}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
log "Upgrading $release ($chart $version)"
# A previous --atomic run whose own rollback never finished leaves the
# release in pending-*, which blocks every future upgrade. Recover first
# so one wedged revision cannot wedge the pipeline forever.
if ! recover_pending_release "$release" "$namespace"; then
echo "ERROR: $release is stuck and automatic rollback did not recover it, run 'helm rollback $release -n $namespace' by hand."
return 1
fi
# --atomic rolls the release back when the upgrade times out or the workloads
# it touches never become ready, so a bad chart bump is not left half applied.
helm upgrade --install "$release" "$chart" \
if ! helm upgrade --install "$release" "$chart" \
--namespace "$namespace" \
--version "$version" \
--values "$REPO/$values" \
--atomic --cleanup-on-fail --timeout 10m
--atomic --cleanup-on-fail --timeout 10m; then
echo "WARN: upgrade of $release failed, checking release state"
# --atomic already attempted its own rollback; finish the job when that
# rollback never completed, otherwise the release stays pending-* and
# blocks every future run.
if ! recover_pending_release "$release" "$namespace"; then
echo "ERROR: upgrade of $release failed and the release did not recover, run 'helm rollback $release -n $namespace' by hand."
else
echo "ERROR: upgrade of $release failed (release is back on its previous revision)."
fi
return 1
fi
done
}
@@ -825,6 +927,32 @@ smoke_hosts() {
| sort -u
}
# Traefik's own list of the routes it actually built. The Kubernetes CRs are the
# wrong source for this: when a middleware fails to load, Traefik drops the
# router that referenced it and leaves the CR behind looking perfectly healthy.
#
# api.insecure is already on for the internal `traefik` entrypoint, but the pod
# IP is not routable from the node, so read it through kubectl exec rather than
# standing up a port-forward. HTTP only: the TCP routers match on HostSNI(`*`)
# and the UDP ones carry no rule at all, both selected by entrypoint and port,
# so neither can answer whether a given host has a route.
traefik_http_routes() {
kubectl -n traefik exec deploy/traefik -- \
wget -qO- --timeout=10 http://127.0.0.1:8080/api/http/routers 2>/dev/null \
| jq -c '[.[] | {status, rule: (.rule // "")}]'
}
# The hosts Traefik currently routes to, one per line. Every backticked token of
# an enabled rule counts, which is a superset of the hosts -- PathPrefix values
# land here too, harmlessly -- but it keeps the host syntax in one place instead
# of a matcher per host. The scan keeps the delimiters, so strip them: what
# belongs in a comparison against a hostname is the bare name.
traefik_routed_hosts() {
jq -r '[.[] | select(.status == "enabled") | (.rule // "")
| scan("`[^`]+`") | ltrimstr("`") | rtrimstr("`")]
| unique | .[]' <<<"$1"
}
# stage_verify_k8s watches the rollout, which reports that the pods converged.
# It cannot tell a converged pod from a serving one: a route pointing at the
# wrong port, a Service selector that matches nothing the app listens on, a 500
@@ -836,6 +964,13 @@ smoke_hosts() {
# or a 404 from a path the service does not serve still means the chain is
# intact. Only a transport failure (no DNS, refused, timeout) or a 5xx means
# the service is not serving, and only those fail the run.
#
# Except that a 404 is not evidence on its own. A router Traefik refused to
# build answers with the same 404 and nothing behind it, so a middleware that
# fails to load -- the crowdsec bouncer, which Traefik disables silently when
# it cannot fetch the plugin -- takes down every route that referenced it while
# this stage reports `ok` for all of them. No status code separates those two
# cases, so ask Traefik which routes it built and fail on the difference.
stage_smoke() {
cd "$REPO"
select_manifests >/dev/null
@@ -882,11 +1017,52 @@ stage_smoke() {
esac
done
# Second gate. The probe above only means something if a router matched the
# host in the first place, so compare the hosts we expect against the hosts
# Traefik reports and fail on the difference.
local routes routed
if ! routes="$(traefik_http_routes)"; then
echo "ERROR: could not read Traefik's router list, refusing to report success"
return 1
fi
routed="$(traefik_routed_hosts "$routes")"
local -a unrouted=()
local tries=3
while :; do
unrouted=()
for h in "${hosts[@]}"; do
grep -qxF "$h" <<<"$routed" || unrouted+=("$h")
done
if [ "${#unrouted[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
break
fi
# A router mid-rollout is legitimately absent for a moment. A middleware
# that failed to load stays absent, so waiting cannot paper over it.
if [ "$tries" -le 1 ]; then
break
fi
tries=$((tries - 1))
warn "${#unrouted[@]} host(s) have no enabled route yet, re-checking in 10s"
sleep 10
if ! routes="$(traefik_http_routes)"; then
break
fi
routed="$(traefik_routed_hosts "$routes")"
done
if [ "${#unrouted[@]}" -ne 0 ]; then
for h in "${unrouted[@]}"; do
echo " NO ROUTE $h (Traefik has no enabled router for this host)"
done
bad=1
fi
if [ "$bad" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "ERROR: at least one active service is not serving over its public route"
return 1
fi
echo "all ${#hosts[@]} route(s) answered"
echo "all ${#hosts[@]} route(s) answered and have a router"
}
stage_apply_compose() {
+44 -3
View File
@@ -73,8 +73,34 @@ jobs:
needs: [validate]
runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, arch, homelab, prod]
# Apply only, no verification, so this is just the work itself: snapshot,
# then up to three sequential `helm upgrade --atomic --timeout 10m`, then the
# apply loop. Verification has its own job and its own budget.
# then sequential `helm upgrade --atomic --timeout 10m`, then the apply loop.
# Verification has its own job and its own budget.
#
# 45 is roughly four times the measured cost of the stage, which is
# deliberately not raised on a theory:
#
# helm, healthy 3 no-op upgrades ~3-5 min
# helm, one release bad --atomic spends its 10m, ~10-15 min
# then rolls that one back
# apply loop ~40 manifests, 4 of which ~1 min
# resolve an image digest
# restart_stale_images 7.6s to find 8 workloads, ~0.5 min
# 9.8s to resolve their digests
#
# The helm figure is one release, not three: `set -e` aborts
# upgrade_helm_releases on the first failure, so a broken release costs
# 10m and the other two are never attempted. Multiplying 10m by three
# overstates the worst case by 20 minutes.
#
# The 45 minutes this was last raised to 45 were still not enough, and the
# job logs for those runs no longer exist, so what actually consumed the
# budget is not known - the two measurable candidates above account for
# ~15 of it. The one unbounded thing left in this stage is
# `docker manifest inspect` at deploy-lib.sh:236, which has no timeout
# against a registry with a known hang mode. Bound it, and make the stage
# announce what it is working on, before spending any of that on a larger
# ceiling: a stage that is killed with a diagnosable last line is a bug
# report, one that vanishes is not.
timeout-minutes: 45
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
@@ -112,7 +138,22 @@ jobs:
needs.apply-k8s.result != 'skipped' &&
needs.apply-compose.result != 'skipped'
runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, arch, homelab, prod]
# ceil(changed_workloads / 8) waves of ROLLOUT_TIMEOUT each, plus rollback.
# Not raised, because the arithmetic does not close.
#
# 32 workloads are under management and the wave width is 8, so the verify
# itself is 4 waves of ROLLOUT_TIMEOUT (300s) = 20 minutes worst case, when
# every rollout times out rather than converging. That is already 20 of 30.
#
# The other 10 would have to absorb rollback, and rollback_workloads is a
# serial `while read` loop at 300s per failed workload. 10 minutes buys two.
# Any larger number is buying a bigger multiple of an unbounded term rather
# than covering a known cost: 60 minutes buys eight, and 60 minutes is
# therefore not a bound, it is a guess with two digits.
#
# The number becomes derivable the moment rollback uses the same wave width
# as the verify: 32 failures then cost 4 waves = 20 minutes instead of 160,
# and 45 covers verify plus rollback at full width. That change is to the
# recovery path and is not folded into a timeout edit.
timeout-minutes: 30
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
+33 -4
View File
@@ -21,10 +21,39 @@ ssh_key="$key_dir/deploy_key"
printf '%s\n' "$DEPLOY_KEY" > "$ssh_key"
chmod 600 "$ssh_key"
ssh -i "$ssh_key" -p "$deploy_port" \
-o BatchMode=yes -o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new \
"${DEPLOY_USER}@${DEPLOY_HOST}" \
"REPO=$deploy_path APPLY_PRUNE=${APPLY_PRUNE:-false} DEPLOY_SHA=${DEPLOY_SHA:-} DEPLOY_SNAPSHOT_DIR=${DEPLOY_SNAPSHOT_DIR:-} STAGE=$1 bash -se" <<'EOF'
# A connection that died silently used to hang until the job timeout, and the
# stage was never re-run: one flaky TCP session cost a whole 45-minute apply.
# ServerAlive* bounds how long a dead peer goes unnoticed, ConnectTimeout bounds
# setup. Only exit 255 - ssh's own transport failures - is retried. A stage that
# fails on its own merits exits with the remote's status, so a real failure
# still surfaces its own log instead of burning three attempts. The stages are
# declarative applies, so re-running one that had already committed is harmless.
ssh_opts=(
-i "$ssh_key" -p "$deploy_port"
-o BatchMode=yes -o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new
-o ConnectTimeout=15
-o ServerAliveInterval=15 -o ServerAliveCountMax=4
)
rc=0
for attempt in 1 2 3; do
if [ "$attempt" -gt 1 ]; then
echo ":: warning::ssh transport failed, retrying (${attempt}/3)"
sleep $((attempt * 5))
fi
rc=0
ssh "${ssh_opts[@]}" "${DEPLOY_USER}@${DEPLOY_HOST}" \
env "REPO=$deploy_path" "APPLY_PRUNE=${APPLY_PRUNE:-false}" \
"DEPLOY_SHA=${DEPLOY_SHA:-}" "DEPLOY_SNAPSHOT_DIR=${DEPLOY_SNAPSHOT_DIR:-}" \
"STAGE=$1" bash -se <<'EOF' || rc=$?
source "$REPO/.gitea/workflows/deploy-lib.sh"
run_stage "$STAGE"
EOF
[ "$rc" -eq 0 ] && break
[ "$rc" -ne 255 ] && break
done
if [ "$rc" -ne 0 ]; then
echo ":: error::stage $1 failed over ssh (exit $rc)"
fi
exit "$rc"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ spec:
memory: "1.5Gi"
cpu: "300m"
requests:
memory: "500Mi"
memory: "1Gi"
cpu: "50m"
ports:
- containerPort: 3000
+3 -3
View File
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ spec:
- containerPort: 9000
resources:
requests:
memory: "700Mi"
memory: "768Mi"
cpu: "300m"
limits:
memory: "1.5Gi"
@@ -86,8 +86,8 @@ spec:
name: authentik-secrets
resources:
requests:
memory: "512Mi"
memory: "320Mi"
cpu: "300m"
limits:
memory: "1Gi"
memory: "768Mi"
cpu: "700m"
+2 -2
View File
@@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ spec:
imagePullPolicy: Always
resources:
requests:
memory: "20Mi"
memory: "32Mi"
cpu: "30m"
limits:
memory: "64Mi"
memory: "128Mi"
cpu: "50m"
envFrom:
- secretRef:
+2 -2
View File
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ spec:
key: TUNNEL_TOKEN
resources:
requests:
memory: "32Mi"
memory: "128Mi"
cpu: "30m"
limits:
memory: "128Mi"
memory: "256Mi"
cpu: "200m"
+3 -2
View File
@@ -31,12 +31,13 @@ spec:
name: bentopdf
ports:
- containerPort: 8080
# p95 4M, max 11M over 7 days. Was 50Mi/700Mi.
resources:
requests:
memory: "50Mi"
memory: "32Mi"
cpu: "50m"
ephemeral-storage: "100Mi"
limits:
memory: "700Mi"
memory: "128Mi"
cpu: "700m"
ephemeral-storage: "5Gi"
+3 -2
View File
@@ -38,13 +38,14 @@ spec:
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /data
name: data
# p95 85M, max 136M over 7 days, spikes while converting. Was 250Mi/1.5Gi.
resources:
requests:
memory: "250Mi"
memory: "128Mi"
cpu: "100m"
limits:
cpu: "1500m"
memory: "1.5Gi"
memory: "512Mi"
volumes:
- name: data
persistentVolumeClaim:
+56 -11
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,17 @@
# crowdsec/k8s is NOT managed by deploy.yaml - apply this by hand, and apply it
# together with a restart:
# kubectl apply -f crowdsec/k8s/crowdsec-middleware.yaml
# kubectl -n traefik rollout restart deploy/traefik
#
# The restart is not optional. In stream mode the plugin runs a package-level
# ticker goroutine (handleStreamTicker over the isCrowdsecStreamHealthy and
# updateFailure globals) that no reconfiguration stops. Applying a change
# wedges the instance: every route referencing it answers 404 and traefik logs
# 'invalid middleware crowdsec-crowdsec-bouncer@kubernetescrd' until the pod is
# replaced. Re-applying the previous config does NOT recover it, and the config
# is not the cause - a valid CIDR cannot fail NewChecker, which is a plain
# net.ParseCIDR. Only a new pod clears it. Measured cost: ~35s down for all
# 20 hosts behind this middleware.
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: Middleware
metadata:
@@ -8,17 +22,48 @@ spec:
crowdsec-bouncer:
enabled: true
LogLevel: INFO
CrowdsecMode: live
# `live` blocked on a `GET /v1/decisions` per request, so a burst
# saturated the LAPI and the plugin 403'd IPs that were never banned.
# v1.3.3 ignores UpdateMaxFailure in `live`, so fail-open is only
# reachable in stream mode, which polls into a cache instead - no
# per-request call to saturate. 15s rather than the 60s default: the
# deploy runner shares one public IP with the house, so this bounds
# both how late a ban lands and how long a lifted one lingers.
CrowdsecMode: stream
UpdateIntervalSeconds: 15
# -1 = never block because the LAPI is unreachable. In v1.3.3
# handleStreamTicker only clears isCrowdsecStreamHealthy when
# updateMaxFailure != -1, and ServeHTTP 403s once it is false, so this
# makes a CrowdSec outage mean "no protection", not "every site 403".
UpdateMaxFailure: -1
CrowdsecLapiScheme: http
CrowdsecLapiHost: crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local:8080
CrowdsecLapiKeyFile: "/etc/traefik/secrets/traefik-api-key"
# LAPI lookup is SYNCHRONOUS and per-request: the plugin blocks on
# `GET /v1/decisions?ip=...&banned=true` before the request reaches
# the backend, and fails CLOSED (403) if the lookup exceeds the
# timeout. Unset, the fork defaults to 10s, which is an eternity for
# a request path: a single slow LAPI (idle 1.3-7.4s here) turned
# every request into a 10s hang and then a self-inflicted 403.
# 2s keeps the fail-closed path fast and bounded; with the LAPI
# resourced properly (see crowdsec-values.yaml) the lookup is
# sub-100ms and this budget is never hit.
CrowdsecLapiTimeout: "2s"
# Bypasses the bouncer and the decision cache, no LAPI round-trip.
# Keep in sync with forust/local-network in crowdsec-values.yaml.
ClientTrustedIPs:
- "127.0.0.0/8"
- "10.0.0.0/8"
- "172.16.0.0/12"
- "192.168.0.0/16"
- "100.64.0.0/10"
- "169.254.0.0/16"
- "fc00::/7"
- "fe80::/10"
# The mobile operator range from forust/mobile-whitelist, repeated
# deliberately rather than relying on the parser whitelist alone.
# That whitelist drops the event before it reaches a bucket, so no
# decision is ever created - but it is one config away from not
# firing, and the bouncer would then enforce a ban that was never
# justified. This is the last line: even a decision that exists for
# any reason is not served against the phone.
- "84.245.64.0/18"
# The name is HTTPTimeoutSeconds, an int in seconds (min 1) - there is
# no CrowdsecLapiTimeout, and an unrecognised key is silently dropped,
# which is how this sat at the 10s default. Nothing rides on it per
# request any more, so this only bounds the stream pull - and too low
# is the dangerous direction: the LAPI needs ~2s to answer
# /v1/decisions/stream, and a pull that times out leaves the ban cache
# frozen at its startup contents ("failed sending new decisions"),
# i.e. new bans silently never apply. Keep it above the pull latency.
HTTPTimeoutSeconds: 10
+84 -20
View File
@@ -58,26 +58,15 @@ config:
reason: "Mobile IP whitelist"
cidr:
- "84.245.64.0/18"
postoverflows:
s01-whitelist:
home-dynamic-ip.yaml: |
name: forust/home-dynamic-ip
description: "Whitelist home dynamic IP"
whitelist:
reason: "Home dynamic IP"
expression:
- evt.Overflow.Alert.Source.IP in LookupHost("ddns.forust.xyz")
# The hairpin-NAT address of the router (192.168.88.1) is what the
# Gitea Actions runner presents to Traefik - it is NOT the home
# dynamic IP, so the whitelist above did not cover it. During a
# deploy the runner POSTs to the Actions API many times a second;
# a single 403 storm was enough to earn it a 4h ban and break every
# later job. Whitelisting the whole LAN also covers phones and
# tablets browsing over 192.168.88.0/24.
lan.yaml: |
name: forust/lan
description: "Whitelist local network"
# CrowdSec's own guidance: CIDR allowlisting belongs at the parser stage.
# A parser whitelist discards the event before it reaches a bucket, so
# these addresses never produce an overflow and never become a decision.
# A postoverflow whitelist is checked only *after* the ban exists, and
# the bouncer answers 403 for as long as it does - which is a window we
# do not want the deploy sitting in.
local-network.yaml: |
name: forust/local-network
description: "Whitelist loopback, private and VPN networks"
whitelist:
reason: "Local network"
cidr:
@@ -85,6 +74,81 @@ config:
- "10.0.0.0/8"
- "172.16.0.0/12"
- "192.168.0.0/16"
# CGNAT range (RFC 6598). The workstation and the k0s node live
# here on WireGuard, and 100.64.0.0/10 is not covered by the
# RFC 1918 blocks above.
- "100.64.0.0/10"
- "169.254.0.0/16"
- "fc00::/7"
- "fe80::/10"
postoverflows:
s01-whitelist:
# The one whitelist that has to stay here: resolving a hostname is a
# network call, and the docs put expensive lookups in postoverflows on
# purpose - it runs only when a bucket actually overflows.
# ddns.forust.xyz is the public home address, not a private one, so
# forust/local-network does not cover it.
home-dynamic-ip.yaml: |
name: forust/home-dynamic-ip
description: "Whitelist home dynamic IP"
whitelist:
reason: "Home dynamic IP"
expression:
- evt.Overflow.Alert.Source.IP in LookupHost("ddns.forust.xyz")
# LAPI-only main config override, merged over config.yaml. NOTE: the
# chart's own default for this key is REPLACED, not merged, so its
# auto_registration block is repeated verbatim below - drop it and the
# agent can no longer register itself.
config.yaml.local: |
api:
server:
auto_registration: # Activate if not using TLS for authentication
enabled: true
token: "${REGISTRATION_TOKEN}" # /!\ Do not modify this variable (auto-generated and handled by the chart)
allowed_ranges: # /!\ Make sure to adapt to the pod IP ranges used by your cluster
- "127.0.0.1/32"
- "192.168.0.0/16"
- "10.0.0.0/8"
- "172.16.0.0/12"
# This homelab has no egress to console.crowdsec.cloud: DNS does
# not resolve. The LAPI kept trying anyway ("Signal push: N
# signals to push", "capi metrics: sending" every 10s) and each
# attempt sat on a resolver timeout WHILE HOLDING A WRITE
# TRANSACTION, which is what kept stalling per-request decision
# lookups even with WAL enabled. Nothing to share and nothing to
# pull - turn the Central API off instead of letting it block the
# only database writer we have.
online_client:
sharing: false
pull:
community: false
blocklists: false
disable_usage_metrics_export: true
db_config:
# SQLite without WAL serialises every reader behind the writer's
# rollback journal, and the LAPI writes constantly: the agent pushes
# Traefik alerts read from Loki, the metrics collector counts
# decisions, the bouncer touches "last pull" on every request.
# Symptom: decision lookups taking 10-30s (and a second connection
# that could not even open the database) while the LAPI sat at 28m
# CPU - the process was blocked in fsync, not computing. Every
# bouncer-protected request then blew through the plugin timeout and
# fail-closed with 403, on every site at once.
# The PVC is local-path-retain (hostPath), not a network share, so
# WAL is safe here; the crowdsec docs recommend it for exactly this
# ("allowing more concurrency in SQLite that will improve
# performances in most scenarios").
use_wal: true
# Keeps the alert table bounded. At the 5000/7d default the file
# reached 54MB in 15 days off the Traefik access log alone, and the
# metrics collector counts decisions on a timer; a smaller working
# set means fewer full scans. Crowdsec only prunes - SQLite never
# shrinks the file, so the size stays until a manual VACUUM.
flush:
max_items: 1000
max_age: 24h
lapi:
env:
+8 -20
View File
@@ -30,10 +30,14 @@
# 3. ensure the static machine exists, recreating it with the
# Secret password if missing (agent retry loops reconnect
# on their own - same name + same password);
# 4. prune bouncer entries idle for 30d;
# 5. delete decisions from LePresidente/http-generic-403-bf, a hub
# scenario that bans an IP for 4h after 5 POST-403s in 10s and
# therefore bans us for our own bouncer's fail-closed 403s.
# 4. prune bouncer entries idle for 30d.
#
# It used to also delete LePresidente/http-generic-403-bf decisions hourly.
# That was a workaround for the bouncer failing closed on a slow LAPI and
# 403-ing the deploy runner into a 4h ban. The bouncer now polls decisions
# into a cache and never blocks on an unreachable LAPI, so it cannot
# manufacture those 403s any more, and the scenario only fires against real
# scanners - deleting their decisions hourly was undoing a working ban.
#
# Manual apply (crowdsec/k8s is NOT managed by deploy.yaml):
# kubectl apply -f crowdsec/k8s/janitor-cronjob.yaml
@@ -196,19 +200,3 @@ spec:
fi
echo "== 4. prune stale bouncers (no pull for 30d) =="
$LAPI_EXEC cscli bouncers prune -d 720h --force
echo "== 5. drop http-403-bf decisions (4h self-bans) =="
# `LePresidente/http-generic-403-bf` (hub item
# crowdsecurity/http-generic-bf v0.9) bans any source IP
# after 5 POSTs answered 403 within 10s, for 4h. That
# includes 403s this homelab generates ITSELF (any
# bouncer fail-closed, any app CSRF/rate-limit 403), and a
# 4h ban on the runner/home IP silently breaks deploys and
# browsing. The scenario cannot be removed per-scenario -
# it is baked into a hub item, and disabling the whole
# base-http-scenarios collection would drop ~40 useful
# detections. Instead we keep the detection and drop its
# decisions hourly; the LAN/home whitelists in
# crowdsec-values.yaml handle the legit sources, so this
# only ever hits real scanners (who are re-banned anyway).
$LAPI_EXEC cscli decisions delete \
--scenario LePresidente/http-generic-403-bf --all || true
+2 -2
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ services:
session-keeper:
build: ./phpsessid-bot
image: gcr.forust.xyz/forust/session-keeper:latest
image: gcr.forust.xyz/forust/session-keeper:prod
pull_policy: build
env_file: .env
restart: unless-stopped
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ services:
webinar-checker:
build: ./webinar-checker
image: gcr.forust.xyz/forust/webinar-checker:latest
image: gcr.forust.xyz/forust/webinar-checker:prod
pull_policy: build
env_file: .env
restart: unless-stopped
+9
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,15 @@ spec:
# renovate: datasource=docker depName=mcr.microsoft.com/playwright versioning=docker
image: mcr.microsoft.com/playwright:v1.56.0-jammy
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
# p95 412M, max 478M over 7 days, no limit before. Request is set at p95
# so the pod is not an eviction candidate; the limit stays above 2x the
# request because browser page lifetimes are unpredictable.
resources:
requests:
cpu: "200m"
memory: "416Mi"
limits:
memory: "1Gi"
command:
- npx
- -y
+2 -2
View File
@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@ spec:
resources:
requests:
cpu: 25m
memory: 64Mi
memory: 32Mi
limits:
cpu: 250m
memory: 256Mi
memory: 128Mi
readinessProbe:
exec:
command: ["redis-cli", "ping"]
+2 -2
View File
@@ -38,10 +38,10 @@ spec:
resources:
requests:
cpu: 25m
memory: 96Mi
memory: 32Mi
limits:
cpu: 250m
memory: 256Mi
memory: 128Mi
readinessProbe:
exec:
command: ["/bin/sh", "-ec", "redis-cli -h redis EXISTS EDU_PHPSESSID | grep -q 1"]
+2 -2
View File
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ spec:
resources:
requests:
cpu: "50m"
memory: "128Mi"
memory: "192Mi"
limits:
cpu: "600m"
memory: "512Mi"
memory: "384Mi"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
services:
errorpage:
build: .
image: gcr.forust.xyz/forust/error-pages:latest
image: gcr.forust.xyz/forust/error-pages:prod
pull_policy: build
container_name: error-pages
restart: unless-stopped
+7
View File
@@ -28,6 +28,13 @@ spec:
containers:
- name: error-pages
image: gcr.forust.xyz/forust/error-pages:prod
# p95 6M, max 10M, no limit before.
resources:
requests:
cpu: "10m"
memory: "32Mi"
limits:
memory: "128Mi"
ports:
- containerPort: 80
readinessProbe:
+6
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ data:
GITEA__mailer__ENABLED: "false"
# No code/issue search needed: bleve reindexes the whole issue index on
# every pod restart (cron.rebuild_issue_indexer RUN_AT_START) and hammers
# the rotational disk for an hour. "db" serves issue search from postgres.
GITEA__indexer__ISSUE_INDEXER_TYPE: "db"
GITEA__indexer__REPO_INDEXER_ENABLED: "false"
GITEA__log__logger.access.MODE: "console, file"
USER_UID: "1000"
USER_GID: "1000"
+2 -2
View File
@@ -47,10 +47,10 @@ spec:
mountPath: /data
resources:
requests:
memory: "512Mi"
memory: "320Mi"
cpu: "300m"
limits:
memory: "1.5Gi"
memory: "1Gi"
cpu: "1300m"
volumes:
- name: gitea-data
+6 -9
View File
@@ -16,15 +16,12 @@ spec:
- name: gitea-service
port: 3000
# Registry route: NO crowdsec-bouncer.
# The bouncer plugin does a blocking `GET /v1/decisions` to the LAPI on
# *every* request. A deploy burst (runner Action API polls, `docker
# manifest inspect` per own image, containerd pulls, smoke probes) fires
# hundreds of parallel registry calls; LAPI saturation pushed the lookup
# past the plugin timeout, and the bouncer fail-closed with 403 - which
# containerd surfaces as ErrImagePull/ImagePullBackOff on the next pod.
# This route only serves authenticated OCI traffic (registry tokens,
# basic-auth already handled by gitea) and scanners get nothing useful
# from /v2, so there is no bruteforce surface to protect here.
# A deploy burst (runner Action API polls, `docker manifest inspect` per
# own image, containerd pulls, smoke probes) fires hundreds of parallel
# registry calls, and a ban on the runner breaks every later job. This
# route only serves authenticated OCI traffic - registry tokens and
# basic-auth are already handled by gitea - and scanners get nothing
# useful from /v2, so there is no bruteforce surface to protect here.
- match: Host(`gcr.forust.xyz`) && PathPrefix(`/v2`)
kind: Rule
services:
+2 -2
View File
@@ -57,10 +57,10 @@ spec:
resources:
requests:
cpu: "50m"
memory: "64Mi"
memory: "32Mi"
limits:
cpu: "200m"
memory: "256Mi"
memory: "128Mi"
volumes:
- name: glance-config
configMap:
+2 -2
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ services:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: Dockerfile.forust
image: gcr.forust.xyz/forust/forust-homepage:latest
image: gcr.forust.xyz/forust/forust-homepage:prod
pull_policy: build
# ports:
# - "8085:80"
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ services:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: Dockerfile.xdfnx
image: gcr.forust.xyz/forust/xdfnx-homepage:latest
image: gcr.forust.xyz/forust/xdfnx-homepage:prod
pull_policy: build
restart: unless-stopped
# ports:
+4 -4
View File
@@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ spec:
failureThreshold: 3
resources:
requests:
memory: "10Mi"
memory: "32Mi"
cpu: "20m"
limits:
memory: "100Mi"
memory: "128Mi"
cpu: "50m"
---
apiVersion: v1
@@ -86,8 +86,8 @@ spec:
failureThreshold: 3
resources:
requests:
memory: "10Mi"
memory: "32Mi"
cpu: "20m"
limits:
memory: "100Mi"
memory: "128Mi"
cpu: "50m"
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
# You can find documentation for all the supported env variables at https://docs.immich.app/install/environment-variables
# The location where your uploaded files are stored. The k8s manifests bind
# mount /mnt/immich/library, which is the sdc9 partition - the same place, so
# the two deployment paths look at one library.
UPLOAD_LOCATION=/mnt/immich/library
# The location where your database files are stored. Network shares are not supported for the database
DB_DATA_LOCATION=./postgres
# To set a timezone, uncomment the next line and change Etc/UTC to a TZ identifier from this list: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tz_database_time_zones#List
# TZ=Etc/UTC
# The Immich version to use. You can pin this to a specific version like "v2.1.0"
IMMICH_VERSION=v3
# Connection secret for postgres. You should change it to a random password
# Please use only the characters `A-Za-z0-9`, without special characters or spaces
DB_PASSWORD=postgres
# The values below this line do not need to be changed
###################################################################################
DB_USERNAME=postgres
DB_DATABASE_NAME=immich
+63
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
name: immich
services:
immich-server:
container_name: immich_server
image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-server:v3
volumes:
- ${UPLOAD_LOCATION}:/data
- /etc/localtime:/etc/localtime:ro
env_file:
- .env
ports:
- "2283:2283"
depends_on:
- redis
- database
restart: always
healthcheck:
disable: false
immich-machine-learning:
container_name: immich_machine_learning
# For hardware acceleration, add one of -[armnn, cuda, rocm, openvino, rknn] to the image tag.
# Example tag: ${IMMICH_VERSION:-release}-cuda
image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-machine-learning:${IMMICH_VERSION:-release}
# extends: # uncomment this section for hardware acceleration - see https://docs.immich.app/features/ml-hardware-acceleration
# file: hwaccel.ml.yml
# service: cpu # set to one of [armnn, cuda, rocm, openvino, openvino-wsl, rknn] for accelerated inference - use the `-wsl` version for WSL2 where applicable
volumes:
- model-cache:/cache
env_file:
- .env
restart: always
healthcheck:
disable: false
redis:
container_name: immich_redis
image: docker.io/valkey/valkey:9@sha256:418652cfb58ef879d4978c33553735d7147016032d5aefaa14c828e611eb9dfd
healthcheck:
test: redis-cli ping | grep -q PONG || exit 1
restart: always
database:
container_name: immich_postgres
image: ghcr.io/immich-app/postgres:14-vectorchord0.4.3-pgvectors0.2.0@sha256:bcf63357191b76a916ae5eb93464d65c07511da41e3bf7a8416db519b40b1c23
environment:
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${DB_PASSWORD}
POSTGRES_USER: ${DB_USERNAME}
POSTGRES_DB: ${DB_DATABASE_NAME}
POSTGRES_INITDB_ARGS: "--data-checksums"
# Uncomment the DB_STORAGE_TYPE: 'HDD' var if your database isn't stored on SSDs
# DB_STORAGE_TYPE: 'HDD'
volumes:
# Do not edit the next line. If you want to change the database storage location on your system, edit the value of DB_DATA_LOCATION in the .env file
- ${DB_DATA_LOCATION}:/var/lib/postgresql/data
shm_size: 128mb
restart: always
healthcheck:
disable: false
volumes:
model-cache:
File renamed without changes.
+28
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
kind: Certificate
metadata:
name: immich-prod-tls
namespace: immich
spec:
secretName: immich-prod-tls
dnsNames:
- immich.forust.xyz
issuerRef:
name: letsencrypt-prod
kind: ClusterIssuer
---
apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
kind: Certificate
metadata:
name: internal-wildcard-tls
namespace: immich
spec:
secretName: internal-wildcard-tls
dnsNames:
- "*.workstation.internal"
- "*.gigaforust.internal"
- workstation.internal
- gigaforust.internal
issuerRef:
name: internal-ca
kind: ClusterIssuer
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: immich-config
namespace: immich
data:
TZ: "Europe/Bratislava"
# The database in this namespace, not the shared one in the database
# namespace: v3 needs VectorChord, and only the dedicated image carries it.
DB_HOSTNAME: "immich-postgres"
DB_PORT: "5432"
DB_USERNAME: "immich"
DB_DATABASE_NAME: "immich"
DB_SSL_MODE: "disable"
DB_VECTOR_EXTENSION: "vectorchord"
REDIS_HOSTNAME: "immich-valkey"
REDIS_PORT: "6379"
# Traefik is the only client of the server, and it is a pod: the address immich
# sees is inside the node's pod CIDR. Without this the server does not trust
# X-Forwarded-For and every request looks like it came from Traefik itself.
IMMICH_TRUSTED_PROXIES: "10.244.0.0/24"
+95
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: immich-service
namespace: immich
spec:
selector:
app: immich
ports:
- name: http
port: 2283
targetPort: 2283
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: immich-deployment
namespace: immich
labels:
app: immich
spec:
replicas: 2
selector:
matchLabels:
app: immich
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: immich
spec:
containers:
- name: immich
image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-server:v3
envFrom:
- configMapRef:
name: immich-config
- secretRef:
name: immich-secrets
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 2283
volumeMounts:
- name: immich-data
mountPath: /data
# The first boot runs migrations and warms the transcoder, which can
# take minutes, so liveness has to wait on the startup probe.
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /api/server/ping
port: http
failureThreshold: 60
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /api/server/ping
port: http
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /api/server/ping
port: http
initialDelaySeconds: 30
periodSeconds: 30
timeoutSeconds: 5
# Only the request is scheduled against, and the node is already
# oversubscribed (5.58 of 6 cores requested) while actually running
# at about 1.5. So the request states what this sits at while idle -
# tens of millicores - and the limit leaves room for the burst that
# matters: thumbnails, transcodes and metadata extraction.
#
# The limit used to be 2Gi, but the server OOMKilled on boot while
# chewing through a backlog of unprocessed assets (API +Workers in
# one container spike well past idle).
resources:
requests:
cpu: "100m"
memory: "512Mi"
limits:
cpu: "1500m"
memory: "4Gi"
volumes:
- name: immich-data
# The library lives on the node's own disk, not in a PVC. A PVC here
# meant declaring a size up front for data that does not exist yet,
# on a provisioner that cannot grow it, and the only copy of the
# photos was one `kubectl delete namespace` away.
#
# Directory, not DirectoryOrCreate, on purpose: if sdc9 is not
# mounted, this must fail loudly instead of quietly writing the
# library onto the root filesystem.
hostPath:
path: /mnt/immich/library
type: Directory
+36
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: IngressRoute
metadata:
name: immich-prod
namespace: immich
spec:
entryPoints:
- websecure
routes:
- match: Host(`immich.forust.xyz`)
kind: Rule
middlewares:
- name: crowdsec-bouncer
namespace: crowdsec
services:
- name: immich-service
port: 2283
tls:
secretName: immich-prod-tls
---
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: IngressRoute
metadata:
name: immich-local
namespace: immich
spec:
entryPoints:
- websecure
routes:
- match: Host(`immich.workstation.internal`) || Host(`immich.gigaforust.internal`)
kind: Rule
services:
- name: immich-service
port: 2283
tls:
secretName: internal-wildcard-tls
+92
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: immich-machine-learning
namespace: immich
spec:
selector:
app: immich-machine-learning
ports:
- name: http
port: 3003
targetPort: 3003
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: immich-machine-learning-deployment
namespace: immich
labels:
app: immich-machine-learning
spec:
replicas: 1
selector:
matchLabels:
app: immich-machine-learning
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: immich-machine-learning
spec:
containers:
- name: immich-machine-learning
image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-machine-learning:v3
envFrom:
- configMapRef:
name: immich-config
- secretRef:
name: immich-secrets
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 3003
volumeMounts:
- name: model-cache
mountPath: /cache
# The first request pulls a model over the internet, so a cold start
# is slower than a container start.
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ping
port: http
failureThreshold: 60
periodSeconds: 5
timeoutSeconds: 5
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ping
port: http
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ping
port: http
initialDelaySeconds: 30
periodSeconds: 30
timeoutSeconds: 5
# Same reasoning as the server: the request covers the idle cost
# only, because the node has no spare cores to schedule against.
# Recognition is the burst - a busy import wants both cores.
resources:
requests:
cpu: "100m"
memory: "1Gi"
limits:
cpu: "2000m"
memory: "3Gi"
volumes:
- name: model-cache
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: immich-model-cache-pvc
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: immich-model-cache-pvc
namespace: immich
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteOnce
resources:
requests:
storage: 2Gi
+5
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
# yaml-language-server: $schema=kubernetes
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: immich
+138
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
# Immich's own database, separate from the shared postgres in the database
# namespace. It has to be separate: v3 checks the VectorChord version at startup
# and refuses to boot without it, VectorChord needs its .so in
# shared_preload_libraries, and that can only be read when postmaster starts.
# So the shared instance would have to be rebuilt on a custom image carrying
# vchord and restarted - for every consumer of it (authentik, gitea, netbox,
# netronome, penpot, statuspage). Not worth it for one photo library.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: immich-postgres
namespace: immich
labels:
app: immich-postgres
spec:
selector:
app: immich-postgres
ports:
- name: postgres
port: 5432
targetPort: postgres
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: StatefulSet
metadata:
name: immich-postgres
namespace: immich
labels:
app: immich-postgres
spec:
serviceName: immich-postgres
replicas: 1
selector:
matchLabels:
app: immich-postgres
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: immich-postgres
spec:
containers:
- name: postgres
# v3.x expects vchord for its vector work and vectors (pgvecto.rs)
# for some index types. This image ships both and preloads them, plus
# its own shared_buffers and wal settings, through
# /etc/postgresql/postgresql.conf - which its entrypoint reaches via
# `postgres -c config_file=...` in the image CMD.
#
# So there is deliberately no `command:` here. Overriding it replaces
# that config_file, and it also loses the step where the entrypoint
# drops from root to the postgres user: postmaster then starts as
# root and refuses to run.
image: ghcr.io/immich-app/postgres:14-vectorchord0.4.3-pgvectors0.2.0@sha256:bcf63357191b76a916ae5eb93464d65c07511da41e3bf7a8416db519b40b1c23
env:
- name: POSTGRES_USER
value: immich
- name: POSTGRES_DB
value: immich
- name: POSTGRES_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: immich-secrets
key: DB_PASSWORD
# Only read when the data directory is empty, so the checksums are
# decided here and never again.
- name: POSTGRES_INITDB_ARGS
value: --data-checksums
# The postgres-data volume lives on sdc, which is rotational. The
# SSD template is the default; HDD only changes the planner costs
# (effective_io_concurrency, random_page_cost), nothing structural.
- name: DB_STORAGE_TYPE
value: HDD
- name: TZ
valueFrom:
configMapKeyRef:
name: immich-config
key: TZ
ports:
- name: postgres
containerPort: 5432
volumeMounts:
- name: postgres-data
mountPath: /var/lib/postgresql/data
# The upstream compose file asks docker for 128mb of shm. Kubernetes
# gives every container 64mb, which is not what postmaster expects
# for parallel query workers and the WAL writer.
- name: shm
mountPath: /dev/shm
# Probes use a generous timeout on purpose: the data lives on a
# rotational disk on a loaded single node, and pg_isready can take
# seconds during WAL recovery. A 1s timeout kills the container
# mid-recovery and restarts the spiral.
startupProbe:
exec:
command: ["sh", "-c", "pg_isready -U immich -d immich"]
failureThreshold: 60
periodSeconds: 5
timeoutSeconds: 5
readinessProbe:
exec:
command: ["sh", "-c", "pg_isready -U immich -d immich"]
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
livenessProbe:
exec:
command: ["sh", "-c", "pg_isready -U immich -d immich"]
initialDelaySeconds: 30
periodSeconds: 20
timeoutSeconds: 5
# The image template sets shared_buffers to 512MB, and the vchord and
# vectors workers are Rust binaries with a real RSS footprint on top
# of postmaster, checkpointer and friends. 1Gi was enough to start
# the server but the vectors worker kept dying in it, so the limit
# sits at 2Gi. The request stays at the idle cost.
resources:
requests:
cpu: "50m"
memory: "256Mi"
limits:
cpu: "1000m"
memory: "2Gi"
volumes:
- name: shm
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
sizeLimit: 128Mi
volumeClaimTemplates:
- metadata:
name: postgres-data
spec:
accessModes: ["ReadWriteOnce"]
# Retain: this is the metadata for a library that only exists in one
# place, and local-path cannot expand a bound volume, so this size has
# to hold until the library is rebuilt or dumped elsewhere.
storageClassName: local-path-retain
resources:
requests:
storage: 32Gi
+13
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: immich-secrets
namespace: immich
type: Opaque
stringData:
# Creates the immich superuser in this namespace's own postgres on first
# boot, and is the same value the server connects with. Nothing outside the
# immich namespace needs it. Letters and digits only: immich reads this into
# a connection string.
DB_PASSWORD: "changeme"
REDIS_PASSWORD: "changeme"
+84
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: immich-valkey
namespace: immich
labels:
app: immich-valkey
spec:
clusterIP: None
selector:
app: immich-valkey
ports:
- name: valkey
port: 6379
targetPort: valkey
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: StatefulSet
metadata:
name: immich-valkey
namespace: immich
labels:
app: immich-valkey
spec:
serviceName: immich-valkey
replicas: 1
selector:
matchLabels:
app: immich-valkey
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: immich-valkey
spec:
containers:
- name: valkey
image: docker.io/valkey/valkey:9.1.2-alpine
command:
- sh
- -c
- valkey-server --appendonly yes --save 30 1 --loglevel warning --requirepass "$REDIS_PASSWORD"
envFrom:
- secretRef:
name: immich-secrets
ports:
- name: valkey
containerPort: 6379
volumeMounts:
- name: valkey-data
mountPath: /data
# Same reasoning as postgres: 1s probe timeouts flap on a loaded
# single node with rotational storage.
startupProbe:
exec:
command: ["sh", "-c", 'valkey-cli --pass "$REDIS_PASSWORD" ping | grep -q PONG']
failureThreshold: 20
periodSeconds: 5
timeoutSeconds: 5
readinessProbe:
exec:
command: ["sh", "-c", 'valkey-cli --pass "$REDIS_PASSWORD" ping | grep -q PONG']
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
livenessProbe:
exec:
command: ["sh", "-c", 'valkey-cli --pass "$REDIS_PASSWORD" ping | grep -q PONG']
initialDelaySeconds: 20
periodSeconds: 20
timeoutSeconds: 5
resources:
requests:
cpu: "25m"
memory: "64Mi"
limits:
cpu: "250m"
memory: "256Mi"
volumeClaimTemplates:
- metadata:
name: valkey-data
spec:
accessModes: ["ReadWriteOnce"]
resources:
requests:
storage: 1Gi
+18 -4
View File
@@ -7,18 +7,32 @@
controller:
type: daemonset
# config-reloader sidecar: p95 33M, max 43M. The chart keeps it at the top level,
# not under `alloy:`.
configReloader:
resources:
requests:
memory: "128Mi"
cpu: "50m"
memory: "32Mi"
cpu: "10m"
limits:
memory: "512Mi"
cpu: "500m"
memory: "128Mi"
image:
tag: "v1.19.2"
alloy:
# p95 275M, max 287M. Alloy tails every pod log and ships it to Loki, so it sits
# on the same IronWolf read path the node is I/O bound on. Request is set at p95.
# The chart key is `alloy.resources`. `controller.resources` is ignored silently,
# which is why this pod shipped with no limits at all.
resources:
requests:
memory: "288Mi"
cpu: "50m"
limits:
memory: "512Mi"
configMap:
create: true
content: |
+27 -4
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,16 @@ loki:
local:
directory: /var/loki/rules
# p95 84M, max 85M for the rules sidecar that shares the singleBinary pod.
# The chart exposes it as `sidecar.resources`, shared with any other sidecar.
sidecar:
resources:
requests:
memory: "96Mi"
cpu: "10m"
limits:
memory: "192Mi"
singleBinary:
replicas: 1
persistence:
@@ -47,10 +57,10 @@ singleBinary:
storageClass: local-path-retain
resources:
requests:
memory: "512Mi"
memory: "256Mi"
cpu: "200m"
limits:
memory: "2Gi"
memory: "1Gi"
cpu: "1000m"
# Zeroed: unused in SingleBinary mode (chart validation requires it).
@@ -63,12 +73,25 @@ backend:
gateway:
replicas: 1
# Single node: chart default is required podAntiAffinity on hostname +
# RollingUpdate 25%/25% (effective maxUnavailable=0 at replicas=1).
# That deadlocks the rollout: the new pod stays Unschedulable while the
# old one lives, and the old one never leaves while the new one is not
# Ready. Null clears the default (an empty map would deep-merge with it
# and keep the required rule); maxUnavailable=1 allows a brief gateway
# outage during rollouts instead of a stuck deploy.
affinity: null
deploymentStrategy:
type: RollingUpdate
rollingUpdate:
maxSurge: 1
maxUnavailable: 1
resources:
requests:
memory: "64Mi"
memory: "32Mi"
cpu: "50m"
limits:
memory: "256Mi"
memory: "128Mi"
cpu: "300m"
monitoring:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
services:
metube:
image: ghcr.io/alexta69/metube:2026.09.25
image: ghcr.io/alexta69/metube:2026.09.27
container_name: metube
restart: unless-stopped
# ports:
+4 -3
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ spec:
spec:
containers:
- name: metube
image: ghcr.io/alexta69/metube:2026.09.25
image: ghcr.io/alexta69/metube:2026.09.27
envFrom:
- configMapRef:
name: metube-config
@@ -36,12 +36,13 @@ spec:
volumeMounts:
- name: downloads
mountPath: /downloads
# p95 72M, max 80M over 7 days. Was 600Mi/2Gi.
resources:
requests:
memory: "600Mi"
memory: "96Mi"
cpu: "400m"
limits:
memory: "2Gi"
memory: "384Mi"
cpu: "1700m"
volumes:
- name: downloads
+9 -6
View File
@@ -7,12 +7,18 @@ spec:
entryPoints:
- websecure
routes:
# NO crowdsec-bouncer on the API routes. These are the mesh client's own
# endpoints: gRPC-gateway management calls plus signal/relay long-polling,
# authenticated by NetBird's token rather than by a login form. A ban here
# is self-defeating - the client needs the mesh to reach anything else, so
# CrowdSec banning it locks the peer out of the network it needs to
# function. It also backfires: a banned peer keeps retrying, every retry
# is another 403, and LePresidente/http-generic-403-bf turns five 403s in
# ten seconds into a 4h ban, so one 403 loop kept re-arming the ban.
# netbird-local below has always been exempt; this makes prod match.
- match: Host(`nb.forust.xyz`) && (PathPrefix(`/signalexchange.SignalExchange/`) || PathPrefix(`/management.ManagementService/`) || PathPrefix(`/management.ProxyService/`))
kind: Rule
priority: 100
middlewares:
- name: crowdsec-bouncer
namespace: crowdsec
services:
- name: netbird-server-service
port: 80
@@ -20,9 +26,6 @@ spec:
- match: Host(`nb.forust.xyz`) && (PathPrefix(`/relay`) || PathPrefix(`/ws-proxy/`) || PathPrefix(`/api`) || PathPrefix(`/oauth2`))
kind: Rule
priority: 100
middlewares:
- name: crowdsec-bouncer
namespace: crowdsec
services:
- name: netbird-server-service
port: 80
+5 -4
View File
@@ -88,12 +88,13 @@ spec:
periodSeconds: 30
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 5
# p95 97M, max 102M over 7 days. Was 256Mi/1Gi.
resources:
requests:
memory: "256Mi"
memory: "128Mi"
cpu: "250m"
limits:
memory: "1Gi"
memory: "384Mi"
cpu: "1000m"
volumes:
- name: netbird-data
@@ -162,10 +163,10 @@ spec:
failureThreshold: 5
resources:
requests:
memory: "64Mi"
memory: "32Mi"
cpu: "50m"
limits:
memory: "256Mi"
memory: "128Mi"
cpu: "300m"
---
apiVersion: v1
+2 -2
View File
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ spec:
resources:
requests:
cpu: "100m"
memory: "512Mi"
memory: "1Gi"
limits:
cpu: "2"
memory: "2Gi"
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ spec:
memory: "256Mi"
limits:
cpu: "1"
memory: "1Gi"
memory: "512Mi"
volumes:
- name: netbox-config
configMap:
+2 -2
View File
@@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ spec:
key: NETRONOME__DB_PASSWORD
resources:
requests:
memory: "100Mi"
memory: "64Mi"
cpu: "100m"
limits:
memory: "512Mi"
memory: "256Mi"
cpu: "500m"
+11 -1
View File
@@ -60,16 +60,26 @@ spec:
command: ["pg_isready", "-U", "postgres", "-d", "postgres"]
initialDelaySeconds: 10
periodSeconds: 10
# Generous timeout: on an I/O-bound single node even exec can take
# seconds, and a 1s default kills a healthy postgres mid-recovery.
timeoutSeconds: 5
startupProbe:
exec:
command: ["pg_isready", "-U", "postgres", "-d", "postgres"]
failureThreshold: 30
# Crash recovery on an I/O-starved single node can fsync for 10+
# minutes; killing postgres mid-recovery restarts the fsync from
# zero and loops forever. 90x10s = 15 minutes of grace.
failureThreshold: 90
periodSeconds: 10
livenessProbe:
exec:
command: ["pg_isready", "-U", "postgres", "-d", "postgres"]
initialDelaySeconds: 30
periodSeconds: 20
# Same I/O reasoning as readiness, plus more misses before a kill:
# restarting postgres on a loaded node only makes recovery longer.
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 5
resources:
requests:
memory: "512Mi"
+27
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,33 @@ spec:
summary: "Pod is crash looping"
description: "Container {{ $labels.container }} in {{ $labels.namespace }}/{{ $labels.pod }} is in CrashLoopBackOff."
- alert: ContainerOOMKilled
expr: max_over_time(kube_pod_container_status_terminated_reason{reason="OOMKilled"}[15m]) >= 1
for: 5m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "Container was OOMKilled"
description: "Container {{ $labels.container }} in {{ $labels.namespace }}/{{ $labels.pod }} was killed for exceeding its memory limit. Raise the limit or reduce the workload."
- alert: ContainerRestartingTooOften
expr: max by (namespace, pod, container) (increase(kube_pod_container_status_restarts_total[30m])) > 3
for: 5m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "Container restarting too often"
description: "Container {{ $labels.container }} in {{ $labels.namespace }}/{{ $labels.pod }} restarted {{ $value }} times in the last 30 minutes."
- alert: PodEvicted
expr: max_over_time(kube_pod_status_reason{reason="Evicted"}[15m]) >= 1
for: 5m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "Pod was evicted"
description: "Pod {{ $labels.namespace }}/{{ $labels.pod }} was evicted, usually for node disk or memory pressure."
- alert: PersistentVolumeClaimFillingUp
expr: kubelet_volume_stats_available_bytes / kubelet_volume_stats_capacity_bytes < 0.15
for: 15m
+62 -2
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,25 @@ grafana:
service:
port: 80
# p95 391M, observed max 1046M with no limit at all. Request is set at p95 so the
# scheduler sees reality; the limit is a manual exception above the 1.3x max
# formula, because a single query burst reached 1046M.
resources:
requests:
memory: "416Mi"
cpu: 100m
limits:
memory: "1536Mi"
# One block covers both the dashboards and datasources sidecars (p95 91M / 80M).
sidecar:
resources:
requests:
memory: "96Mi"
cpu: 10m
limits:
memory: "192Mi"
additionalDataSources:
- name: Loki
type: loki
@@ -48,13 +67,21 @@ prometheus:
storage: 40Gi
resources:
requests:
memory: "700Mi"
memory: "768Mi"
cpu: 200m
limits:
memory: "2Gi"
memory: "2560Mi"
alertmanager:
alertmanagerSpec:
configSecret: alertmanager-config
# p95 66M, max 68M. Silences and notification state live here, so the request
# stays above p95 to keep the pod out of the eviction candidates.
resources:
requests:
memory: "96Mi"
cpu: 10m
limits:
memory: "192Mi"
storage:
volumeClaimTemplate:
spec:
@@ -66,6 +93,39 @@ alertmanager:
requests:
storage: 20Gi
# p95 103M, max 107M, and it grows with the number of cluster objects.
kube-state-metrics:
# Values key is the dependency name from Chart.yaml, not the `kubeStateMetrics`
# condition key. Setting resources under `kubeStateMetrics:` is silently ignored.
resources:
requests:
memory: "128Mi"
cpu: 50m
limits:
memory: "256Mi"
# p95 39M, max 40M. One per node, so it scales with node count.
prometheus-node-exporter:
resources:
requests:
memory: "32Mi"
cpu: 20m
limits:
memory: "128Mi"
# p95 75M, max 75M. Creates and reconciles every PrometheusRule in the cluster.
prometheusOperator:
resources:
requests:
memory: "96Mi"
cpu: 50m
limits:
memory: "192Mi"
# config-reloader sidecars (p95 33M, max 43M) are not covered: the chart does not
# template `prometheusSpec.configReloader.resources`, so there is no values key
# for them. They keep shipping with requests only.
defaultRules:
disabled:
CPUThrottlingHigh: true
+2 -2
View File
@@ -66,10 +66,10 @@ spec:
periodSeconds: 30
resources:
requests:
memory: "128Mi"
memory: "160Mi"
cpu: "100m"
limits:
memory: "512Mi"
memory: "384Mi"
cpu: "500m"
volumes:
- name: rackpeek-config
+5 -2
View File
@@ -11,10 +11,13 @@ reloader:
replicas: 1
# The chart defaults to no requests or limits, so the pod is evictable under node
# pressure and the restarts go with it.
# Memory was raised from 64Mi: measured p95 over 7 days is 73M, so the pod was
# running above its own request and sitting in the eviction candidates. This pod
# is the one that restarts every other pod, so it must not be evicted.
resources:
requests:
cpu: "10m"
memory: "64Mi"
memory: "96Mi"
limits:
cpu: "100m"
memory: "128Mi"
memory: "192Mi"
+4 -1
View File
@@ -10,13 +10,16 @@ spec:
failedJobsHistoryLimit: 3
jobTemplate:
spec:
# Reap finished job pods (including manual `create job --from` runs,
# which history limits never delete). Keeps a day for debugging.
ttlSecondsAfterFinished: 86400
backoffLimit: 1
template:
spec:
restartPolicy: Never
containers:
- name: renovate
image: renovate/renovate:44.115.9
image: renovate/renovate:44.115.13
env:
- name: RENOVATE_PLATFORM
value: gitea
+3 -2
View File
@@ -38,12 +38,13 @@ spec:
volumeMounts:
- name: cache
mountPath: /var/cache/searxng
# p95 134M, max 145M over 7 days. Was 300Mi/700Mi.
resources:
requests:
memory: "300Mi"
memory: "160Mi"
cpu: "30m"
limits:
memory: "700Mi"
memory: "512Mi"
cpu: "500m"
volumes:
- name: cache
+7
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,13 @@ spec:
containers:
- name: valkey
image: docker.io/valkey/valkey:9.1.2-alpine
# p95 15M, max 17M, no limit before. Matches the netbox valkey pod.
resources:
requests:
cpu: "50m"
memory: "64Mi"
limits:
memory: "256Mi"
command:
- valkey-server
- --save
+2 -2
View File
@@ -38,10 +38,10 @@ spec:
mountPath: /app/data
resources:
requests:
memory: "128Mi"
memory: "160Mi"
cpu: "100m"
limits:
memory: "256Mi"
memory: "384Mi"
cpu: "300m"
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
+11
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: traefik-plugins
namespace: traefik
spec:
accessModes: ["ReadWriteOnce"]
storageClassName: local-path
resources:
requests:
storage: 256Mi
+7
View File
@@ -28,6 +28,13 @@ updateStrategy:
deployment:
enabled: true
additionalVolumes:
- name: plugins
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: traefik-plugins
additionalVolumeMounts:
- name: plugins
mountPath: /plugins-storage
providers:
kubernetesIngress:
+2 -1
View File
@@ -28,9 +28,10 @@ spec:
containers:
- name: uptime-kuma
image: louislam/uptime-kuma:2.5.5
# p95 469M, max 471M over 7 days. Was a 3Gi limit on 469M of real use.
resources:
limits:
memory: "3Gi"
memory: "1Gi"
cpu: "1"
requests:
memory: "512Mi"
+2 -2
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ services:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: Dockerfile
image: gcr.forust.xyz/forust/userbot:latest
image: gcr.forust.xyz/forust/userbot:prod
pull_policy: build
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ services:
- 1.1.1.1
anna:
image: gcr.forust.xyz/forust/userbot:latest
image: gcr.forust.xyz/forust/userbot:prod
pull_policy: build
depends_on:
- forust
+4
View File
@@ -210,6 +210,10 @@ spec:
- name: USERBOT_IMAGE
# The build pushes main/prod only. The deploy resolves every gcr ref in
# this file, so a :latest here aborts the whole apply as unresolvable.
# Deliberately left on the tag: render_pinned only rewrites plain
# `image:` lines to a digest, and this ref is what the panel injects
# into the per-instance Deployments it creates. Instances track prod
# rather than the panel's own resolved digest.
value: gcr.forust.xyz/forust/userbot:prod
- name: USERBOT_STORAGE_CLASS
value: local-path-retain
+2 -2
View File
@@ -36,10 +36,10 @@ spec:
resources:
requests:
cpu: "100m"
memory: "128Mi"
memory: "80Mi"
limits:
cpu: "500m"
memory: "512Mi"
memory: "256Mi"
volumeMounts:
- name: vaultwarden-data
mountPath: /data
+2 -2
View File
@@ -51,10 +51,10 @@ spec:
mountPath: /etc/x-ui
resources:
requests:
memory: "128Mi"
memory: "192Mi"
cpu: "100m"
limits:
memory: "1Gi"
memory: "512Mi"
cpu: "1000m"
volumes:
- name: x-ui-db