The parser-stage whitelist already covers 84.245.64.0/18, so an event
from the phone is dropped before it reaches a bucket and no decision is
ever created for it - confirmed against 72h of traefik access logs, where
the phone shows up as 84.245.120.147, inside that /18. But that left the
bouncer's own ClientTrustedIPs without the range, so the guarantee rested
on a single config. If the parser whitelist ever stops matching, a ban
would be created and then served against the phone, which is the one
thing that must not happen: the address belongs to a carrier, so it comes
back to us by rotation and a 4h ban is not survivable from the device.
ClientTrustedIPs bypasses the bouncer and the decision cache entirely, so
repeating the range there holds even if a decision exists for any reason.
All nine parser-stage ranges are now mirrored in the bouncer, and the
bouncer has no range the parser stage does not know about.
The file header now records that this middleware must be applied together
with a traefik restart. Applying it alone wedges the plugin: in stream
mode handleStreamTicker runs over package-level globals that no
reconfiguration stops, so every route referencing the middleware answers
404 with 'invalid middleware crowdsec-crowdsec-bouncer@kubernetescrd'
until the pod is replaced. Re-applying the prior config does not recover
it and the config is not the cause - NewChecker is a plain net.ParseCIDR
and cannot fail on a valid range. That cost 21 routes down before the
restart requirement was found; recovery is a pod replace, ~35s.
Verified live: middleware applied, traefik restarted, 17 of 20 hosts
serving (the three exceptions are unchanged and unrelated - searxng
returns its own 429, checkmk is down with 503, and one host is
local-only), zero invalid-middleware errors, and the LAPI still shows
/v1/decisions/stream polls at the 15s interval.
Chasing why apply-k8s kept dying mid-run turned up a self-inflicted
ban loop. 585 of 586 LePresidente/http-generic-403-bf alerts in the LAPI
came from 193.181.211.79 - our own VPS - POSTing
/management.ManagementService/GetServerKey, i.e. the NetBird client's
own management call. netbird-server had never seen a single one of them,
so the 403 was not NetBird's: the bouncer was rejecting the request
before it got there. A banned peer keeps retrying, each retry is another
403, and the scenario turns five 403s in ten seconds into a 4h ban, so
the loop kept re-arming the ban it was serving. The hourly janitor step
that deleted those decisions hourly was masking all of it.
* netbird/k8s/ingress.yaml - drop the bouncer from the mesh API routes
(gRPC-gateway management, signal, relay, /api, /oauth2). A ban there
locks a peer out of the network it needs to reach anything else, and
those endpoints authenticate by NetBird token, not by a login form.
The dashboard keeps the bouncer; it is a real login surface.
netbird-local was already exempt, so this makes prod match.
* crowdsec-middleware.yaml - CrowdsecMode stream instead of live. live
blocked on GET /v1/decisions per request, so a burst saturated the
LAPI and the plugin 403'd IPs that were never banned. v1.3.3 ignores
UpdateMaxFailure in live, so fail-open is only reachable in stream;
-1 now means an unreachable LAPI degrades to "no protection" rather
than "every site 403". 15s poll instead of the 60s default, because
the runner shares one public IP with the house.
Also corrects the key name: HTTPTimeoutSeconds, not
CrowdsecLapiTimeout, which never existed and was being silently
dropped, leaving the 10s default. Back at 10, not the 2s f7cd75d
guessed - a pull that times out leaves the ban cache frozen at its
startup contents, so new bans would silently never apply.
* crowdsec-values.yaml - CIDR allowlisting moves to parsers/s02-enrich,
where CrowdSec's docs put it: a parser whitelist drops the event before
it reaches a bucket, so those addresses never become a decision at
all. The old postoverflow LAN list was checked only after the ban
existed, which is the window the deploy kept landing in. Added
100.64.0.0/10, which the RFC 1918 blocks miss and where the
workstation, the k0s node and the VPS actually live. The DDNS
home-IP whitelist stays in postoverflows, because resolving a hostname
is the expensive check the docs reserve that stage for.
ClientTrustedIPs mirrors that list so the bouncer skips the LAPI
round-trip entirely for those addresses.
* janitor-cronjob.yaml - drop step 5. The bouncer can no longer
manufacture 403s, so the only remaining firings of that scenario are
real scanners, and deleting their decisions hourly was undoing a
working ban.
* Also lands the LAPI config.yaml.local (SQLite WAL, Central API off,
bounded flush) that f7cd75d's comments referenced but never included:
the LAPI was blocked in fsync on its rollback journal, and the CAPI
resolver held a write transaction while timing out against a host
this network cannot reach.
Verified in-cluster: no new 403-bf alerts in the 3.5min after applying,
the management endpoint answers 404 from the backend instead of 403 from
the bouncer in 0.17s, and the VPS client reports Management and Signal
connected with 2/2 relays.
Every bouncer-protected request blocks on a synchronous
GET /v1/decisions against the LAPI, and the plugin fails CLOSED with 403
when that lookup exceeds its timeout. The LAPI was capped at 400m/500Mi
on a single replica, so idle lookups measured 1.3-7.4s and a deploy
burst pushed them past the fork's implicit 10s default: gitea answered
403 for ten seconds straight, and containerd turned those 403s on
gcr.forust.xyz into ErrImagePull/ImagePullBackOff on freshly rolled
pods.
Three changes, plus the 403 feedback loop that made it sticky:
* gitea/k8s/ingress.yaml - drop the bouncer from the /v2 registry route.
A deploy fires hundreds of parallel authenticated OCI requests
(runner Action API, manifest inspect per own image, containerd pulls,
smoke probes) and scanners gain nothing from a registry that already
does its own token auth. The web UI route keeps the bouncer.
* crowdsec-values.yaml - LAPI to 1500m/1Gi. Replicas stay at 1 on
purpose: LAPI is stateful (BoltDB plus credentials on two RWO PVCs),
so a second replica would corrupt the decision store.
* crowdsec-middleware.yaml - CrowdsecLapiTimeout: 2s instead of the
implicit 10s, so a slow LAPI costs a fast 403 rather than a 10s hang.
LePresidente/http-generic-403-bf then banned us for our own 403s: five
POSTs answered 403 within 10s earn a 4h ban, and the hairpin-NAT
address 192.168.88.1 that the Gitea Actions runner presents to Traefik
is not covered by the home-dynamic-IP whitelist. That scenario cannot
be dropped per-scenario - it is baked into the hub item
crowdsecurity/http-generic-bf v0.9, and disabling the whole
base-http-scenarios collection would cost ~40 useful detections. So the
janitor now deletes its decisions hourly and a new forust/lan
whitelist postoverflow covers 192.168.88.0/24. First janitor run
removed 165 decisions; none of the remaining ones are local.
Measured after: gitea 200 in 25-148ms (was 403 at 10001ms), a 60-way
parallel burst all 200 with a 422ms max, gcr /v2 back to its 401 auth
challenge, LAPI at 60m CPU with no throttling.
Protect public Traefik routes with CrowdSec HTTP decisions and restore access logging for web traffic analysis.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
forust
