Eighteen containers had no memory limit at all, so nothing on the node could
bound them. Three of the values files even claimed to set resources: Helm does
not complain about a key it does not recognise, so the block sat there looking
like a limit while the pod ran unbounded.
alloy is the one that mattered. The chart reads `alloy.resources`; the file had
`controller.resources`, so the DaemonSet that tails every pod log on the node
shipped with nothing at all. `kubeStateMetrics` is the same trap in a different
shape -- that is the condition key, the values live under `kube-state-metrics` --
and `configReloader` in the alloy chart sits at the top level rather than under
`alloy`. Each one is verified by rendering the chart and reading the resources
back off the containers, because a values key that is ignored looks exactly
like one that works.
reloader turned out to be set and still wrong: 64Mi request against a measured
p95 of 73M, so the pod ran permanently above its own request and stayed a
standing eviction candidate. That is the pod that restarts every other pod, so
it is the last one that should be evicted. Raised to 96Mi.
Requests are set at p95 throughout, grafana, playwright and alloy included.
Left at the values first proposed they would have sat below their own p95 and
queued for eviction ahead of everything smaller. CPU limits are deliberately
absent: the node is I/O bound at 5% CPU, and CFS throttling would turn disk
wait into runnable-throttled, which is the failure mode that took the node down.
The prometheus and alertmanager configReloader sidecars are left open: chart
86.2.3 does not template the key, so reaching those two containers needs a
postRenderer.
Verified: all four charts render with the resources landing on the intended
containers, and 16/16 local gates pass.
2026.09.13-d4ce87c23 was never published (upstream tags month without leading zero); rollout stuck in ImagePullBackOff. Verified replacement tag exists on Docker Hub.
All prod IngressRoutes switch tls.certResolver to tls.secretName
backed by per-router Certificates (HTTP-01, letsencrypt-prod).
adguard-prod reuses the shared adguard-certs secret (also feeds
DoT :853); sync CronJob removed as redundant.
Traefik certificatesResolvers removed: its internal
acme-http@internal router hijacks HTTP-01 for every host while
enabled, blocking external solvers. Dormant files (kener,
downtify) converted for consistency but not applied; n8n
untouched per live-only rule.
Protect public Traefik routes with CrowdSec HTTP decisions and restore access logging for web traffic analysis.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
services marked k8s/active are applied via kubectl; the rest via docker
compose. inactive services with k8s/ keep only routing manifests
(external Services, EndpointSlices, Ingresses) to reach docker backends.
headscale/nextcloud routing moved to k8s/routing/.
validations: compose config --quiet + kubectl apply --dry-run=client.
namespace manifests applied first. pull_policy:build stacks get
build+push before up so the registry image stays fresh.
forust
