fix(crowdsec): stop the bouncer from 403-ing our own deploys

Every bouncer-protected request blocks on a synchronous
GET /v1/decisions against the LAPI, and the plugin fails CLOSED with 403
when that lookup exceeds its timeout. The LAPI was capped at 400m/500Mi
on a single replica, so idle lookups measured 1.3-7.4s and a deploy
burst pushed them past the fork's implicit 10s default: gitea answered
403 for ten seconds straight, and containerd turned those 403s on
gcr.forust.xyz into ErrImagePull/ImagePullBackOff on freshly rolled
pods.

Three changes, plus the 403 feedback loop that made it sticky:

* gitea/k8s/ingress.yaml - drop the bouncer from the /v2 registry route.
  A deploy fires hundreds of parallel authenticated OCI requests
  (runner Action API, manifest inspect per own image, containerd pulls,
  smoke probes) and scanners gain nothing from a registry that already
  does its own token auth. The web UI route keeps the bouncer.
* crowdsec-values.yaml - LAPI to 1500m/1Gi. Replicas stay at 1 on
  purpose: LAPI is stateful (BoltDB plus credentials on two RWO PVCs),
  so a second replica would corrupt the decision store.
* crowdsec-middleware.yaml - CrowdsecLapiTimeout: 2s instead of the
  implicit 10s, so a slow LAPI costs a fast 403 rather than a 10s hang.

LePresidente/http-generic-403-bf then banned us for our own 403s: five
POSTs answered 403 within 10s earn a 4h ban, and the hairpin-NAT
address 192.168.88.1 that the Gitea Actions runner presents to Traefik
is not covered by the home-dynamic-IP whitelist. That scenario cannot
be dropped per-scenario - it is baked into the hub item
crowdsecurity/http-generic-bf v0.9, and disabling the whole
base-http-scenarios collection would cost ~40 useful detections. So the
janitor now deletes its decisions hourly and a new forust/lan
whitelist postoverflow covers 192.168.88.0/24. First janitor run
removed 165 decisions; none of the remaining ones are local.

Measured after: gitea 200 in 25-148ms (was 403 at 10001ms), a 60-way
parallel burst all 200 with a 422ms max, gcr /v2 back to its 401 auth
challenge, LAPI at 60m CPU with no throttling.

crowdsec/k8s/crowdsec-middleware.yaml

@@ -12,3 +12,13 @@ spec:
       CrowdsecLapiScheme: http
       CrowdsecLapiHost: crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local:8080
       CrowdsecLapiKeyFile: "/etc/traefik/secrets/traefik-api-key"
+      # LAPI lookup is SYNCHRONOUS and per-request: the plugin blocks on
+      # `GET /v1/decisions?ip=...&banned=true` before the request reaches
+      # the backend, and fails CLOSED (403) if the lookup exceeds the
+      # timeout. Unset, the fork defaults to 10s, which is an eternity for
+      # a request path: a single slow LAPI (idle 1.3-7.4s here) turned
+      # every request into a 10s hang and then a self-inflicted 403.
+      # 2s keeps the fail-closed path fast and bounded; with the LAPI
+      # resourced properly (see crowdsec-values.yaml) the lookup is
+      # sub-100ms and this budget is never hit.
+      CrowdsecLapiTimeout: "2s"

crowdsec/k8s/crowdsec-values.yaml

@@ -68,6 +68,23 @@ config:
           reason: "Home dynamic IP"
           expression:
             - evt.Overflow.Alert.Source.IP in LookupHost("ddns.forust.xyz")
+      # The hairpin-NAT address of the router (192.168.88.1) is what the
+      # Gitea Actions runner presents to Traefik - it is NOT the home
+      # dynamic IP, so the whitelist above did not cover it. During a
+      # deploy the runner POSTs to the Actions API many times a second;
+      # a single 403 storm was enough to earn it a 4h ban and break every
+      # later job. Whitelisting the whole LAN also covers phones and
+      # tablets browsing over 192.168.88.0/24.
+      lan.yaml: |
+        name: forust/lan
+        description: "Whitelist local network"
+        whitelist:
+          reason: "Local network"
+          cidr:
+            - "127.0.0.0/8"
+            - "10.0.0.0/8"
+            - "172.16.0.0/12"
+            - "192.168.0.0/16"
 
 lapi:
   env:
@@ -90,13 +107,20 @@ lapi:
       enabled: true
       size: 1Gi
       storageClassName: local-path-retain
+  # LAPI answers a blocking /v1/decisions lookup for EVERY bouncer-protected
+  # request (whole Traefik front door), so it is the hot path of the proxy.
+  # At 400m/500Mi it went CPU-throttled and idle lookups measured 1.3-7.4s,
+  # which pushed requests into the bouncer's fail-closed 403.
+  # Single replica on purpose: LAPI is stateful (BoltDB on the `data` PVC,
+  # credentials on the `config` PVC) - two replicas sharing those RWO
+  # volumes would corrupt the decision store. Scale up CPU, not replicas.
   resources:
     limits:
-      cpu: 400m
+      cpu: 1500m
-      memory: 500Mi
+      memory: 1Gi
     requests:
-      cpu: 50m
+      cpu: 250m
-      memory: 150Mi
+      memory: 500Mi
   service:
     type: ClusterIP
   storeLAPICscliCredentialsInSecret: true

crowdsec/k8s/janitor-cronjob.yaml

@@ -30,7 +30,10 @@
 #       3. ensure the static machine exists, recreating it with the
 #          Secret password if missing (agent retry loops reconnect
 #          on their own - same name + same password);
-#       4. prune bouncer entries idle for 30d.
+#       4. prune bouncer entries idle for 30d;
+#       5. delete decisions from LePresidente/http-generic-403-bf, a hub
+#          scenario that bans an IP for 4h after 5 POST-403s in 10s and
+#          therefore bans us for our own bouncer's fail-closed 403s.
 #
 # Manual apply (crowdsec/k8s is NOT managed by deploy.yaml):
 #   kubectl apply -f crowdsec/k8s/janitor-cronjob.yaml
@@ -193,3 +196,19 @@ spec:
                   fi
                   echo "== 4. prune stale bouncers (no pull for 30d) =="
                   $LAPI_EXEC cscli bouncers prune -d 720h --force
+                  echo "== 5. drop http-403-bf decisions (4h self-bans) =="
+                  # `LePresidente/http-generic-403-bf` (hub item
+                  # crowdsecurity/http-generic-bf v0.9) bans any source IP
+                  # after 5 POSTs answered 403 within 10s, for 4h. That
+                  # includes 403s this homelab generates ITSELF (any
+                  # bouncer fail-closed, any app CSRF/rate-limit 403), and a
+                  # 4h ban on the runner/home IP silently breaks deploys and
+                  # browsing. The scenario cannot be removed per-scenario -
+                  # it is baked into a hub item, and disabling the whole
+                  # base-http-scenarios collection would drop ~40 useful
+                  # detections. Instead we keep the detection and drop its
+                  # decisions hourly; the LAN/home whitelists in
+                  # crowdsec-values.yaml handle the legit sources, so this
+                  # only ever hits real scanners (who are re-banned anyway).
+                  $LAPI_EXEC cscli decisions delete \
+                    --scenario LePresidente/http-generic-403-bf --all || true

gitea/k8s/ingress.yaml

@@ -15,11 +15,18 @@ spec:
       services:
         - name: gitea-service
           port: 3000
+    # Registry route: NO crowdsec-bouncer.
+    # The bouncer plugin does a blocking `GET /v1/decisions` to the LAPI on
+    # *every* request. A deploy burst (runner Action API polls, `docker
+    # manifest inspect` per own image, containerd pulls, smoke probes) fires
+    # hundreds of parallel registry calls; LAPI saturation pushed the lookup
+    # past the plugin timeout, and the bouncer fail-closed with 403 - which
+    # containerd surfaces as ErrImagePull/ImagePullBackOff on the next pod.
+    # This route only serves authenticated OCI traffic (registry tokens,
+    # basic-auth already handled by gitea) and scanners get nothing useful
+    # from /v2, so there is no bruteforce surface to protect here.
     - match: Host(`gcr.forust.xyz`) && PathPrefix(`/v2`)
       kind: Rule
-      middlewares:
-        - name: crowdsec-bouncer
-          namespace: crowdsec
       services:
         - name: gitea-service
           port: 3000